University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Technically Bankrupt
Brook E. Gotberg
University of Missouri School of Law, gotbergb@missouri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
Recommended Citation
Brook E. Gotberg, Technically Bankrupt, 48 Seton Hall Law Review 111 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs/801

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Technically Bankrupt
Brook E. Gotberg
What is the difference between a robot and a lawyer? The answer is
not a joke, and may soon be a matter of great urgencyfor attorneys, as the
legal field attempts to adjust to disruptive technologies that are likely to
permanently alter the way that law is practicedthroughoutthe United States.
The consequences for failing to adjust to technological disruptionfor any
industry, as demonstrated in recentyears by big-name, bankrupt companies,
can be disastrous. Legal tools found in chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
are largely intended to assist debtors in reorganizingtheir business affairs,
preserving value by shedding unprofitable business activities and
redirectingresources to more profitable venues. However, these tools grow
less effective as companies become more insolvent, and catching up on
technological advancement becomes more difficult the farther a company
falls behind. Law firmsface an additionalincentive to adjust to technology
early; although they may file for bankruptcy like other businesses, they have
historically struggled to reorganize due in large part to the ability and
propensity of firm asset-the attorneys themselves-to simply leave the
company. Accordingly, lawfirms, faced with an arrayofnew and disruptive
technologies, should draw on the lessons ofpriorindustryfailures and make
adjustments swiftly, before finding themselves "technically " bankrupt.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Advances in technology can bring about significant changes. In
addition to the positive outcomes typically observed with technological
breakthroughs, such as the faster, easier, and more efficient provision of
goods and services, such advances can also be highly disruptive.' In
particular, these new technologies can have the effect of severely devaluing
old technologies, and by extension, old ways of doing business. Capital and
human resources dedicated to implementing older forms of technology that
were previously essential to company production can go from being valuable
assets to costly liabilities in a relatively brief span of time.

1 See James Manyika et al., Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life,
business, and the global economy, McKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (May 2013), http://www.mc
kinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-technologies.
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Technological disruption is an inevitable reality for every industry and
an increasingly frequent observation in recent years.2 As technological
methods such as automation, robotics, data storage, and artificial intelligence
improve their ability to accomplish tasks faster, more accurately, and more
efficiently, providers of goods and services will need to adjust to the
changing technological landscape. Rapidly, the provision of less efficient,
less accurate, or otherwise less desirable products will become a losing
proposition and companies will need to change with the market in order to
stay in business. This is as true for law firms as it is for any other industry
and, for reasons described below, the pressure to respond to evolving
technology is particularly relevant for big law firms.
Businesses and industries are often slow to realize that innovation and
adjustment to technological advances is necessary-that it was necessary
months or even years prior-and that failure to adjust in the appropriate time
frame has had devastating consequences for long-term profitability. For
many companies, such tardy realization sparks the need for a bankruptcy
filing as a last-ditch effort to preserve the business as a going concern.
Bankruptcy proceedings can provide valuable tools that are intended to
enable a struggling business to right itself, shedding unprofitable ventures
and obtaining fresh capital infusions to invest in updated technology. These
proceedings, accessed through chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, establish
the creation of a bankruptcy estate. The debtor, acting as trustee of the estate
(commonly referred to as the debtor in possession or DIP) is able to negotiate
with creditors using the leverage of bankruptcy protection, which includes a
Ideally, through
prohibition against creditors' attempts to collect.4
negotiations in bankruptcy overseen by a bankruptcy judge, a debtor and its
creditors can come to an agreement through which the debtor may restructure
and continue on a more profitable path, arising from the ashes of
unprofitability like the fabled phoenix.
However, as demonstrated by noteworthy bankruptcy filings in recent
years, a delayed response to technological innovation can create obstacles to
long-term profitability that not even powerful bankruptcy tools and
sympathetic bankruptcy judges can overcome. 5 Waiting too long to
innovate, to readjust, or even to file for bankruptcy can and has proved fatal
to companies that once were household names, such as Blockbuster LLC and
2

HENRY C. LUCAS, JR., THE SEARCH FOR SURVIVAL: LESSONS FROM DISRUPTIVE

TECH1NOLOGIES 4 (2012) (observing that compared with previous disruptive periods, the
discontinuity introduced by technological disruption is likely to be a permanent state in the
economy).

'

See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).

4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 1101 (2012); see also discussion infra note 53 and
accompanying text.
See discussion infra note 184 and accompanying text.
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Borders Group, Inc. Even companies that can survive a bankruptcy
provoked by delayed response to technological disruption, such as Eastman
Kodak Company, can be permanently altered and face an uncertain future.
The legal profession, with its long history, its reputation for riskaversion, and its love of precedent, is generally viewed as an industry that is
perpetually slow to adapt to technological advances. 6 While the practice of
law may be different from the sale of books, the rental of movies, or the
production of film, it is in no way immune from the forces of technical
progress that can and will shape the industry, with or without the consent of
practitioners.
Recent developments in technology, especially the
development of artificial intelligence, 7 can and will have an impact on how
law is practiced and how legal services are rendered.8
This is especially true for law firms employing over 100 attorneys,
commonly referred to as "BigLaw" firms. 9 Although they comprise a
relatively small proportion of the legal industry, BigLaw firms and
perceptions surrounding them have a disproportionate impact on the

&

6 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis & Kristen Murray, Using Information Literacy to Prepare
Practice-Ready Graduates, 39 U. HAW. L. REv. 1, 6 (2016) ("the legal profession has the
reputation of being conservative and slow to change in general"); Timothy J. Toohey, Beyond
Technophobia: Lawyers'Ethicaland Legal Obligationsto Monitor Evolving Technology and
Security Risks, 21 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 9, 4 (2015).
7 Used here, the reference to artificial intelligence (also known as Al) is to "weak" Al,
through which machines are able to accomplish tasks performed by humans, rather than
"strong" Al, which implies the ability to think like a human by making ethical judgments,
applying symbolic reasoning, or managing social situations. As of yet, strong Al is found
only in works of fiction. See Monika Hengstler, Ellen Enkel & Selina Duelli, Applied
Artificial Intelligence and Trust-The Case ofAutonomous Vehicles and Medical Assistance
Devices, TECH. FORECASTING & SOCIAL CHANGE 105 (2016). But see Anthony J. Casey
Anthony Niblett, The Death ofRules and Standards(Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 550, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract-2693826 (imagining a world in
which laws are precisely tailored using technological advances and predictive technology to
establish precise directives for any given factual scenario).
8 See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts (Mar. 1, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2927459

(suggesting that predictive capabilities created by big data and artificial intelligence will allow
parties to draft contracts that permit automatic analytics to fill in contract details to arrive at
the parties' desired outcomes). But see Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?:
Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law 4 (Nov. 27, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2701092
(concluding, based on a
technical analysis, that automation has a less significant impact on the demand for lawyers'
time than popular accounts suggest); Steve Lohr, I, Robot, Esq.? Not Just Yet, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 20, 2017, at Bl.
9 Although a term of art subject to various interpretations, "BigLaw" generally refers to
large and typically prestigious law firms employing at least 100 attorneys, which pay market
rates to their associates. "BigLaw" positions are accordingly highly desired. See e.g., Alison
Monahan, How to Get a BigLaw Job: Understandingthe Basics ofBigLaw, BALANCE (June
9, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-get-a-biglaw-job-2164672.
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American legal culture.io In many ways, BigLaw firms shape expectations
regarding attorney salary, hours, and practice, despite the fact that the
average attorney performs strikingly different functions and makes
substantially less than the typical BigLaw attorney. BigLaw firms are
particularly vulnerable to technological advances because many of these
advances work to remove the advantages of being big. In other words,
developments in artificial intelligence make it possible for a single attorney,
using the appropriate software, to conduct legal research and review factual
records faster and more accurately than a dozen BigLaw partners and
associates. This reality severely undermines the BigLaw model, and will at
a minimum require an adjustment of priorities in training and using attorneys
within BigLaw firms.
The lessons of previously well-known and outwardly successful
companies that have failed, in large part because they adjusted to
technological disruption too late in the game, would suggest that BigLaw
should not delay in responding to technological advances if it wishes to
remain a feasible economic model. In fact, BigLaw has an even greater
incentive than companies in other more capital-intensive industries to
This is because bankruptcy
respond before too much time passes.
proceedings, typically viewed as the last resort for companies, have proved
Although it may be
almost universally fatal for large law firms."
conceivable for a company that has delayed response to technological
innovations to "catch up" through bankruptcy proceedings, law firms have
historically been unable to do so.1 2 The provision of legal services is indeed
different from the sale of goods and the manufacturing of products, but not
because the legal field is somehow inoculated from technological disruption.
Instead, the differences between law firms and bookstores, movie rental
conglomerates, and film manufacturers simply limits the comparative
usefulness of a bankruptcy remedy. This is all the more reason why law
firms should take heed early, to adjust while there is time to do so, and not
to rely on bankruptcy proceedings as a last-ditch effort to change course.
This Article operates to some extent as a cautionary tale for all members
of the legal profession, but most particularly for large law firms. Part II
identifies some of the technological disruptions currently facing the legal

10 See, e.g., Jordan Weissman, Why the Fall of Big Law Matters, ATLANTIC (July 23,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/07/why-the-fall-of-big-law2013),
matters/278040/ (suggesting BigLaw drove most of the growth in the legal profession in the
years leading up to 2008).
1 See John Morley, Why Law Firms Collapse 1 (Yale Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for
Studies in Law, Econ. & Public Policy Research Paper No. 521, Mar. 11, 2015), https://papers
.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2580616 ("Law firms don't just go bankrupt-they

collapse.").
12

Id. at 1-2.
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community and looks ahead to the possible (if not probable) technological
advances yet to come. Part III briefly explains how companies faced with
technological disruption may respond using legal tools available through
federal bankruptcy proceedings and how these tools can be helpful. Part IV
demonstrates the limitations of bankruptcy proceedings, often a company's
last resort, to rehabilitate companies facing obsolescence by virtue of
technological advance. This Part also briefly describes the bankruptcy
proceedings of three well-known and highly respected companies and
identifies generally applicable lessons drawn from their experiences. Part V
argues that the lessons derived from these bankruptcies, combined with the
historical experience of law firms in bankruptcy, signal the need for law
firms to respond early to technological disruption in order to avoid possible
collapse.
II. DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW

The headlines are eye-catching, but the prospect for many lawyers is
terrifying: Law Firm Retains a Robot with Powers of Attorney; 13 U.S. Law
Firm 'Hires'Robot-Lawyer;14 Billable Milliseconds? Meet Ross, Lawyer of
the Future.15 Are attorneys truly about to be replaced by robots or artificial
intelligence? Although the consensus appears to be, "not anytime soon,"' 6
there is a general expectation that technology will advance in a direction that
favors increasing use of artificial intelligence and computer software
programs to accomplish tasks previously performed exclusively by
attorneys. Some practitioners are already taking advantage of technology to
assist in tasks such as document review, legal research, and even writing
briefs. Current trends suggest that these technologies will only improve in
speed and accuracy, leading to the assumption that use of these technologies
will only increase with time. The following section describes some of the
more prevalent or newsworthy developments.
A. eDiscovery
The development of electronic record-keeping was a mixed blessing for
the legal field. The ability of computer servers, internet pages, and handheld
devices to preserve and reproduce potentially relevant information vastly

1

Karen Turner, Law Firm Retains a Robot with Powers ofAttorney, WASH. POST, May

23, 2016, at Al l.
14 Warren May, U.S. Law Firm 'Hires'Robot-Lawyer, Ross; He May Not Come into the
Office, but Toronto-CreatedRoss can do an ArticlingStudent's Job, TORONTO STAR, May 20,

2016, at GT6.
15

Jeff Gray, Billable Milliseconds? Meet Ross, Lawyer of the Future, GLOBE AND MAL

(Toronto), Dec. 12, 2014, at Bl.
16

See Lohr, supra note 8.

2017]1

TECHNICALLYBANKRUPT

117

expanded the universe of discoverable documents and applicable due
diligence in any given legal matter. This introduced an added layer of
complexity for lawyers, but also dramatically increased their workload by
increasing the information to be requested and reviewed for both litigation
and transactional purposes.1 7 The added workload created a need for a larger
number of attorneys to work on cases just to manage the increased volume
of paper to be sifted through and flagged as privileged, relevant to litigation,
or potentially problematic for deal terms.
Reviewing documents is a tedious, unpleasant task, typically assigned
in the larger firms to the most junior associates or even contract attorneys.
Those conscripted into document review have long felt that it is a task that a
trained monkey could do. Accordingly, it came as little surprise to many that
one of the earliest technological developments in the legal field was the
As software becomes
ability to better search and filter documents.
increasingly powerful, it may soon be the case, if it is not already, that
computer programs will become more effective than human professionals in
locating potentially relevant or privileged information.
These programs have the added advantage of being able to "read"
documents faster, more continuously, and at a higher consistency rate than
the biggest, best, and most skilled team of attorneys. For example, COIN, a
program JPMorgan Chase & Co. adopted in June of 2016, has recently
boasted the ability to review commercial loan agreements for errors,
accomplishing 360,000 hours of review work in a single year. 8 As described
in a recent news story, "[t]he [COIN] software reviews documents in
seconds, is less error-prone and never asks for vacation."" Given the ability
of computers to perform consistently and efficiently in a way that humans
could never match, it is only a matter of time before repetitious tasks like
document review, even though historically performed by educated
professionals, will be accomplished by machines instead of humans.20
1 See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs in a Properly Functioning
Civil ProcedureSystem, 90 OR. L. REv. 993, 996 (2012) ("Most recently, electronic record
keeping made it possible to discover the previously undiscoverable-albeit at considerable
burdens of time and expense-thereby suggesting a need for a different balancing among the
competing interests in discovery.").
18 Hugh Son, JPMorganSoftware Does in Seconds What Took Lawyers 360,000 Hours,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2017, 7:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0228/jpmorgan-marshals-an-army-of-developers-to-automate-high-finance (last updated Feb.
28, 2017, 7:24 AM).
19 Id.
20 Although perhaps less inspiring, it is somewhat amusing to imagine a mighty standoff
between a law firm's most productive associate and a program such as COIN, in the spirit of
the ballad of John Henry. See William Grimes, Taking Swings at a Myth, With John Henry
the Man, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006, at E9 (observing that the John Henry behind the legend

likely died of silicosis, a lung disease prompted by the inhalation of silicon dust). One
supposes that the associate would surrender long before the computer broke down, although
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B. Chatbots and LegalZoom
Although pro se representation is nothing new, recent developments
have provided greater access and assistance to individuals seeking legal help
without hiring a live attorney. Such help may be provided through the use
of chatbots, which are simple artificial intelligence programs that can answer
questions through text or even via webcam. Chatbots can trace their origins
to the Turing test, which was established by Alan Turing, one of the pioneers
of computing. Turing suggested that a computer's intelligence could be
tested based on how well it could trick humans into thinking it was itself a
human based on its responses to questions.2 1 In recent years, chatbots and
similar devices have been used to assist individuals in defending themselves
in legal proceedings. Perhaps the most famous example involves traffic
tickets.
Joshua Browder was a teenager with no formal legal training 22 when he
began programming DoNotPay, a website that assists motorists in appealing
parking tickets by providing a list of potential defenses for the user to select23
and an online form for users to enter the factual basis for their defenses. The
program generates a letter of appeal, incorporating the options selected by
the user. One could imagine that this sort of technology, which is both
relatively easy to set up and to duplicate, will improve over time to cover an
increasing number of applications, potentially implicating legal work outside
traffic court.
A more established and well-known company in the realm of pro se
legal representation, with perhaps a less memorable back story, is
LegalZoom. LegalZoom is an online company that provides customers with
assistance in preparing legal documents such as business documents, wills,
and divorce filings, through use of software that guides customers to fill out
forms themselves, informed by prompts from the software based on previous
responses. The company has been challenged on the grounds that it engages
in the unauthorized practice of law, but it has largely settled these suits while

suffering a fatal stroke after several days of review would not be inconceivable.
21 See Holly Ryan, When the robots are smarter than us,
N.Z. HERALD (Oct. 14, 2016,
6:12 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?cid=3&objectid=1172
7587 (noting that "[i]n 2014, a computer successfully imitated a 13-year-old boy in a text
conversation, fooling a number ofjudges").
22 Browder did have an extensive history with parking tickets. Helen Weathers & Beth
Hale, Meet the boy genius who can get you offa parkingfine, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 1, 2016, 5:51
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3381510/Meet-boy-genius-parking-fine-Josh
ua-18-fed-getting-tickets-set-website-help-escape-penalties.html (last updated Jan. 2, 2016,
3:42 AM).
23 Examples include "My car was stolen" and "There was a medical emergency," as well
as options for missing or incorrect details on the ticket. See DoNotPay, http://powerfuljourney-59211 .herokuapp.com/list/332 (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
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maintaining operations. 24 To the extent lawyers would otherwise be hired to
perform such tasks, their automation poses a disruption that could
conceivably spread to other areas, including more general litigation
proceedings.
C. Artificial Intelligence
The most striking and newsworthy development of the past few years
has been the rise of artificial intelligence in accomplishing legal work. The
recent unveiling of a program touted as the first "robot lawyer," ROSS
Intelligence or ROSS, made headlines.25 Modeled after Watson, the artificial
intelligence that beat former winner Ken Jennings on Jeopardy in 2011,
ROSS was first adopted commercially in 2016 in the bankruptcy practice
area of Baker & Hostetler.26 As of the drafting of this article, ROSS is being
used by, or is in trial with, at least seventeen law firms, and is in trial with
several law schools.27 Although conceptually related to the Westlaw and
Lexis search engines, with which it will likely compete, ROSS claims to be
different in terms of its ability to apply "machine learning," i.e., permitting
the program to become more adept in its responses to legal questions through
user feedback.2 8
24 See George Leef, Why The Legal Profession Says LegalZoom Is Illegal, FORBES (Oct.
14, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2014/10/14/why-the-legalprofession-says-legalzoom-is-illegal/#16d79de95663; Terry Carter, LegalZoom resolves
$10.5M antitrustsuit against North CarolinaState Bar, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoomresolves_1 0.5m antitrust suit against_
north carolina state bar.
25 See, e.g., Karen Turner, Meet 'Ross,' the newly hired legal robot, WASH. PosT (May
16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-rossthe-newly-hired-legal-robot/?utmterm=.777b593298cc.
26 Debra Cassens Weiss, In a first, a BigLaw firm announces it will use artificial
intelligence in one of its practice areas, ABA J. (May 9, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/in_a_first_a biglaw-firm announcesitwilluse artificial_intelligence ino/.
27 See Susan Beck, Inside ROSS: What Artificial Intelligence Means for Your Firm,
LAW.COM (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.1aw.com/sites/almstaff/2016/09/28/inside-ross-whatsee also ROSS
artificial-intelligence-means-for-your-firm/?slreturn=20170627142627;
Intelligence, Do more than humanly possible, (2017), http://www.rossintelligence.com/

(listing law firms using ROSS).
28 See Brian Baxter, ROSS Intelligence Lands Another Law Firm Client, AM. LAw. (Oct.
6, 2016), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202769384977/ROSS-Intelligence-LandsAnother-Law-Firm-Client?slreturn=20170824105226. (ROSS co-founder Andrew Arruda
has acknowledged the competition posed by Westlaw and Lexis, both of which have a far
longer history in the legal field and a much larger subscriber base. However, he has also
observed, "When you're a big company and you've built your product around old technology,
and a new technology comes out, to change and adapt, you have to gut your underlying
technology. Let's not forget that most companies in the legal research space started as
publishing companies, not as technology companies. That gives us a great competitive
edge."). See also Beck, supra note 25. User interface with ROSS would be familiar to most
people; one would need to simply type a question into the search bar, as if searching Google,
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Moreover, ROSS is being constantly developed to include additional
features, providing services that have traditionally been the realm of junior
associates. One of the most intriguing features is ROSS's ability to write a
memo on any given legal topic and deliver it by email. Although the memos
currently are less polished than could be provided by a skilled associate,29
the technology continues to advance and improve. Indeed, the program has
a built-in feedback loop, whereby attorneys may comment on the quality of
the ROSS memo, permitting the program to learn which products are
satisfactory and which require further fine-tuning. The memo feature, while
still in the early stages of development, has the capacity to take over a
significant amount of work currently done by associates, particularly if
expanded to include drafting of briefs, contracts, discovery documents, and
more. There is no reason to doubt that artificial intelligence will eventually
expand in that direction. In an era of rapidly developing technology,
"eventually" may be a matter of only a few years, if not a few months. 3 0
Artificial intelligence has developed for transactional attorneys as well.
Kira Systems, a perhaps less-touted but equally disruptive technology, was
founded by Noah Waisbeg, a former BigLaw associate who looked for ways
that artificial intelligence could facilitate the review of contracts as part of
due diligence. 3 ' Kira Systems operates to extract vital information from
documents faster and more accurately than human review could ever hope
to accomplish. One of Kira Systems's clients reported efficiency gains of
between forty and seventy percent. 32 Deloitte, perhaps the most well-known
client of Kira Systems, has widely implemented the program in its day-today operations.33

and, within seconds, applicable rulings with appropriately summarized passages that are ready
for quoting or inclusion in a brief are available on the screen.
29 See Beck, supra note 27.
30 Within the past several months, artificial intelligence has made progress that few
dared
to predict. See Cade Metz, In a Huge Breakthrough, Google's Al Beats a Top Player at the
Game of Go, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/in-a-huge-break
through-googles-ai-beats-a-top-player-at-the-game-of-go/ ("Earlier this month, top Al
experts outside of Google questioned whether a breakthrough could occur anytime soon, and
as recently as last year, many believed another decade would pass before a machine could
beat the top humans [at Go].").
31 Artificial Lawyer, The Kira Systems Story, ARTIFICIAL LAW. (Aug. 16, 2016),
https://www.artificiallawyer.com/2016/08/16/the-kira-systems-story/.
32
Eric Rosenbaum, Can elite law firms survive the rise of artificial intelligence? The
jury is still out, CNBC (Nov. 17, 2016, 2:31 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/17/can-cash
-cow-of-elite-legal-firms-survive-ai-the-jury-is-still-out.html.
33

id.
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D. BigLaw's Vulnerability
It would be premature to suggest that the advances documented above
signal the end of lawyers as we know it, although others have so claimed. 34
This article also does not suggest that these advancements, in isolation, will
have the effect of systematically destroying demand for BigLaw work.
Instead, the argument here is more modest: technological developments will
require a reevaluation of how large law firms function, particularly how they
train their associates, bill their time, and market their products. Law firms
that do not reevaluate and adjust to technologies run the substantial risk of
becoming uncompetitive and too large and unwieldly to make the necessary
adjustments to meet a changing market demand. In light of the technological
innovations described above, BigLaw is likely to require a significant
business overhaul, in large part because of the sheer size of its firms.
BigLaw firms earn the title by being big, although compared to law
firms half a century ago, they are huge, enormous, even gargantuan. For
example, in 1960, the largest firm in the United States had only 169
lawyers. 35 In the year 2016, 17 law firms had over 1,000 U.S.-based
attorneys, with thousands more overseas.36 There are various explanations
for why firms have expanded so significantly in recent years, the most
plausible being the perceived need for a large number of attorneys to service
large clients on large matters. 7 Large matters involve, among other things,
large populations of documents, complex issues requiring research, and a
significant amount of drafting, alongside a healthy amount of strategizing,
negotiating, and planning.

34

See, e.g.,

RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF

LEGAL SERVICES (Oxford Univ. Press 2010); Paul Lippe & Daniel Martin Katz, 10 Predictions
About How IBM's Watson Will Impact the Legal Profession, ABA J. (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/10_predictions-about-how-ibms-watson-wil
I impact ("Once we have fully artificial intelligence enhanced programs like LegalZoom,
there will be no need for lawyers, aside from the highly specialized and expensive large-lawfirm variety."). See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Death ofBig Law, 2010 Wis. L. REv. 749,
752 (2010) (arguing that Big Law operates on a basically precarious business model, and
demonstrating the need for changes to that model). But see Bernard A. Burk & David
McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectiveson the Future of the Law Firm in the New
Economy, 2011 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 101 (2011) (rejecting Ribstein's claim that the large
American law firm is dying, even while acknowledging that the form is "brittle" and subject
to change).
35

ANTHONY

T. KRONMAN,

THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL

&

PROFESSION 273-74 (1993).
36 For a discussion of how law firms have grown and changed over the past 50 years, see
Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 11.
3 See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 34, at 758 (observing that legal work often involves a
peak load problem, where clients may require a significant amount of work on short notice,
making it difficult to outsource portions of the work to multiple smaller firms); Burk
McGowan, supra note 34, at 57-58.
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Law firms can currently afford to employ a large number of attorneys
on large client matters because those matters produce large fees. Most law
firms use the billable hour model to charge clients. Under this model,
attorneys keep track of their time, usually in six- or fifteen-minute
increments, and report their totals along with a brief explanation of the work
performed during that time period.
Attorneys charge an hourly rate
depending on their experience and skill, often tracking the number of years
out of law school and partnership status. Clients pay for the minutes worked
by each attorney at that attorney's going rate, rather than the overall product
obtained.38 Although the billable hour is an easy and simple method for
calculating the cost of legal services, it is also highly problematic. For one
thing, it encourages inefficiency, as the more the number of hours worked
on a product, the larger the revenue. This incentive is exacerbated by internal
firm policies that reward associates for exceeding a certain number of
billable hours in a year, or punish associates who fail to meet that benchmark
number. This effect is further distorted when there is insufficient work to
keep all associates occupied, encouraging associates to pad their hours
further, take longer to finish products, or otherwise spend more time in the
office absent pressing work or meaningful tasks.3 9
Indeed, Biglaw associates have a reputation for being deeply unhappy,
despite earning highly competitive salaries. The most obvious source of
discontent is the high number of hours associates are expected to dedicate to
their craft in order to maximize revenue from the billable hour model.
Another, less obvious problem arises from the structure of the firms
themselves-in particular, their size and managerial makeup. Most big firms
operate on a model under which each partner is supported by multiple
associates. Partners partake in firm profits, whereas associates are paid a set
salary, determined by the voting partners. Partners are able to increase their
own incomes by maximizing the profit of the associates. This has typically
been accomplished by hiring more associates and requiring them to work
additional hours under the billable hour model. In order to get the highest
level of profits, BigLaw firms will typically only take on significant client
matters that will support high hourly rates over a significant number of hours,
keeping multiple associates busy on small slices of the case or transaction.4 0
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. Some firms will bill on
a product model,
although the quoted cost often incorporates the amount of time worked, and there are cases
taken on a contingency basis.
3
As observed by one critic, "[n]othing requires leaders to use the billable hour regime
that causes so much misery, but almost all big firms and many others have adhered to it ...
Clients detest its perverse rewards for inefficiency; associates crumble under its pressures. ...
Long ago, clients should have rebelled. For some reason, they still don't." STEVEN J. HARPER,
38

THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS 171 (2013).

4

Id. at 77-78 ("The regime [of high associate to partner ratios, high hourly rates, and
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Because associates typically work on small sections of a larger case,
they are significantly less likely to be involved in the types of experiences
that attracted them to the law in the first place. For example, large cases
rarely go to trial, and when they do, junior associates are typically only
tangentially involved with courtroom experiences or client interactions. In
some firms, associates may compete with each other for the ability to
participate in meaningful experiences, creating an even more difficult work
environment, as associates must out-work (or out-ingratiate) each other in
order to merit what work is available. 4 ' Opportunities for mentorship with
partners are also diminished as the ratio of associates to partners increases.
Taken together, these factors go a long way towards explaining the
dissatisfaction of many associates, who frequently leave BigLaw after only
a few years. BigLaw firms, for their part, recognize associate dissatisfaction,
but rather than ameliorate it, simply build associate turnover into their hiring
and staffing models.42
It is generally accepted that technology can and will permit attorneys to
accomplish many of the tasks accomplished by junior associates faster,
cheaper, and more accurately as technology improves. The ability of
artificial intelligence such as ROSS to eventually provide responses to legal
research questions more quickly, succinctly, and accurately than even the
most skilled associate calls into question the value of paying flesh-and-blood
associates to perform such tasks.4 3 As the artificial intelligence improves, it
will make even less sense to hire attorneys except to interact with the
computer software, perhaps through editing, proofreading, or otherwise
providing feedback for more polished products later on." Although
high billable hours] yields predictable results.

Only large client matters will support

associates' high hourly rates. Small cases and disputes that enabled an earlier generation of
lawyers to develop courtroom and client experiences have dropped away.").
41 Id. at 59 ("The prevailing model of the big law firm bears much of the blame for
increasing dissatisfaction among attorneys in such institutions. Too often, the model deprives
lawyers of autonomy, creates an environment that rewards selfish behavior, and does little to
promote collegiality. As for their daily tasks, most big-firm attorneys spend the vast majority
of their time on small slices of large cases or transactions. Those matters can be financially
lucrative and professionally rewarding for the firm's senior partners, but junior attorneys often
feel little connection to an overall mission.").
42 For some, this means simply maintaining a significant associate/partner ratio. See id.
at 180 ("Between 1985 and 2010, the average leverage ratio for the Am Law 50 firms doubled,
from 1.76 to 3.54.").
43 This is the promise of "machine learning." See Arthur L. Samuel, Some Studies in
Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. OF RESEARCH & DEV. 210, 211
(1959), https://www.cs.virginia.edu/-evans/greatworks/samuell959.pdf (suggesting that
programming computers to learn from their own experiences will allow computers to greatly
outperform the average person and eliminate the need for detailed programming).
4 As predicted by Professor Ryan Calo at the University of Washington School of Law,
"[e]ventually, I bet not using these systems will come to be viewed as antiquated and even
irresponsible, like writing a brief on a typewriter." Karen Turner, Meet 'Ross,' the newly
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promoters of ROSS, as well as its early adopters, have stressed that the
product is not intended to "replace" attorneys, but rather "to help them move
faster, learn faster, and continually improve,"4 5 such technology will
necessarily change how attorneys work, how they spend their time, and how
they can justify billable hours, particularly in BigLaw firms. 4 6
One of the principal effects of technology is to undermine the value of
being big. 4 7
With machines accomplishing more historically timeconsuming tasks, fewer individuals are required to manage cases. As one
commentator observed, "[l]arge law firms have no advantage whatsoever
when it comes to technology."4 8 Another predicted, "[t]here are now so
many ways in which corporate clients can cut legal costs that the very
expensive legal services of large law firms are going to be called for in a
shrinking number of situations." 49 There is already evidence that corporate
clients are turning to sources other than large law firms to satisfy their legal
servicing needs. A recent study examining the productivity of 51 Am Law
100 firms,50 44 Am Law Second 100 firms,5 1 and 57 additional midsize firms
indicated that lawyer productivity, measured by hours billed, has suffered a
steady decline over the past 10 years. 52 Overall, billable hours have fallen
roughly 10%, although much more significantly for non-equity partners and
senior or staff counsel.5 3 Even associates, whose numbers have been
hired legal robot,

WASH. POST

(May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/

innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legal-robot/?utmterm=.08e1940769

85.
45
46

Stand,

Id.

This reassessment is intended by Ross founders. See The Atlantic, Watson Takes the
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/sponsored/ibm-transformation-of-business/

watson-takes-the-stand/283/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017) ("'People are reassessing the
structure in place which revolves around the billable hour,' says Andrew Arruda, another of
the ROSS co-founders. 'A lot of clients have refused to pay for the time spent doing research.
They see it as part of what you should be doing anyway."'). As one adopter of Kira Systems
explained, "It's not the death of the law firm partnership model, but it will change over time.
No one can say how, exactly, but we have to think about how we price and work."
Rosenbaum, supra note 32.
47 See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 761 (observing that technical advances have eroded the

advantages of BigLaw).
48 Valerie Katz, Size Matters: Small Firms and Big Technology, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar.
3, 2011), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/03/size-matters-small-firms-and-big-technology/.
49 Elizabeth G. Olson, Big Law has a shrinkage problem, FORTUNE (Jun. 26, 2013),

http://fortune.com/2013/06/26/big-law-has-a-shrinkage-problem/?iid=sr-link10.
5o This term refers to the ranking of law firms by gross revenue as published by The
American Lawyer. See, e.g., The American Lawyer, The Am Law 100: Firms Ranked by
Gross Revenue, (Apr. 26, 2017), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202784616627.
51 See supra note 48.
52

See GEO. LAW: CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ET AL., 2017 REPORT

ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET, http://legalexecutiveinstitute.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/01/2017-Report-on-the-State-of-the-Legal-Market.pdf.
53 id.
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significantly reduced over the past 10 years, experienced a drop in
productivity. In the meantime, firms have compensated for the lack of
productivity by raising their rates, which has then resulted in greater client
pushback and a decreasing rate of collection realization. 5 4 It should be
obvious to most observers that a pattern in which firms maintain profits by
charging more for less work is not sustainable, particularly in a competitive
market.
Law firms, unlike other industries, do not enjoy economies of scale
based on their size. As reported by one consulting firm, "[1]arger firms
almost always spend more per lawyer on staffing, occupancy, equipment,
promotion, malpractice and other non-personnel insurance coverages, office
supplies and other expenses than do smaller firms."55 It may not be the case
that large law firms will disappear overnight, but it seems very likely that the
BigLaw model will soon lose its competitive edge if it does not adjust to
technological advances. 56 Smaller firms may be able to accomplish the same
amount of work as BigLaw firms by using machines and a fewer number of
attorneys, particularly if those attorneys are better trained and more
motivated.
This observation has ramifications for law firms, lawyers, and law
schools as well. If computers are able to better accomplish much of what
junior associates used to do, lawyers must be better at engaging in tasks that
computers are not yet able to accomplish in order to compete with the
machines. Incoming associates will need to be trained and prepared to
engage more in the "classical" practice of law: client interaction, negotiation
with opposing counsel, and court appearances. In addition, associates will
need to become skilled in monitoring technological product-editing
computer-generated memos and briefs, and providing feedback through the
user interface. Further, associates will need to learn (or re-learn) skills
Although artificial intelligence is
associated with being "human." 58

54 Id.
55 HARPER, supranote 39, at 75. See also Ribstein, supra note 34, at 772 (observing that
multiple recent law firm bankruptcies can be attributed in part to an over commitment to office
space and an inability to repay loans). See also Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 70
(noting that large law firms may introduce diseconomies of scale in the way of multiple
conflicts of interest, friction inherent in management, and coordination problems).
56 See Burk & McGowan, supra note 34, at 86 ("[I]f the client is going to demand that a
firm use contract lawyers or a third party for document review anyway, who cares whether
the lawyers that do the core legal work have 10 lawyer colleagues or 1000?").
5 There is some evidence to suggest that BigLaw firms may already be looking to reduce
associate to partner ratios. See id. at 94 n.22 1.
58 See Matthew Kay, Robot Lawyers: How Humans Can FightBack, TIMES (U.K.) (May
26, 2016), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/robot-lawyers-how-human-ones-can-fightback-8qmwqlfwx ("[I]n an age where real-life lawyers are starting to have to differentiate
themselves from new cyborg competitors, they need to focus on polishing up their human
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constantly improving in its ability to interact with humans, 9 the best
computers are still not able to appear in court or to engage in "the practice of
law" as defined by most legal standards. Absent a major breakthrough in
how technology is used, attorneys will remain necessary for higher-level
strategy and skill, and this, in addition to their ability to successfully
implement a strategic approach with clients, opponents, and the court, is
where their value still lies.
There is much work to be done on how law firms can and should adjust
to new technology-far more than can be covered in this Article. But
perhaps the more pressing concern is how to convince firms and practicing
attorneys to begin adjustment now. Extensive training or retraining of
associates is likely to be costly and difficult. Why should BigLaw firms
attempt such an endeavor when profits are not currently threatened, and the
technology, although promising, is not yet able to fully replicate a good
associate's work product? The answer is tied up in the history of firms that
face technological disruption. The time to adjust is early on, because waiting
can be disastrous, if not fatal.
III. RESPONSIVE TOOLS FOR TECHNOLOGY-INDUCED FINANCIAL OR
ECONOMIC DISTRESS60

By virtue of the inherent costs associated with restructuring a business
model or making any other major change, companies are typically loathe to
do so until faced with outside pressures, such as a decrease in earnings or a
slump in stock price. If the economic pressure is not significant, then
businesses may be able to respond incrementally, spreading the costs of
restructuring over time. If adjustment is not particularly expensive, because
it need not be particularly large or particularly significant, then companies
may also borrow, offer additional securities, or otherwise increase capital
sufficient to take the company in a new direction. However, when significant
changes must be made in response to severe pressure, when costs are high
and the necessary adjustments are overdue, companies must typically resort
to more drastic measures, up to and including bankruptcy proceedings.
Bankruptcy proceedings are very useful when companies cannot otherwise
acquire the working capital they need to make adjustments due to being
overleveraged or otherwise lacking in credit worthiness. As explained
below, such companies, as debtors, have the ability to restructure old debt

skills, particularly their emotional intelligence").
5
See Tom Simonite, Customer Service Chatbots Are About to Become Frighteningly
Realistic, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603895/
customer-service-chatbots-are-about-to-become-frighteningly-realistic/.
60 See the discussion on the distinction between economic and financial distress infra
Part IV.
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and to attract new investment through bankruptcy tools. The longer
companies wait to respond to technological disruption, the more likely they
are to require bankruptcy proceedings in order to access outstanding capital
and restructure obligations. What is more, if companies wait too long to file,
the bankruptcy itself is less likely to be successful.
A bankruptcy filing is a legal proceeding in the federal courts that has
the effect of superseding the state law rights of creditors. The primary
advantage for bankruptcy filers is the ability to coerce creditors into
negotiation. A debtor cannot compel creditors to accept less than they are
owed pursuant to state law, even though creditors may voluntarily accept a
lesser amount. In bankruptcy, debtors may propose plans that force
creditors, broadly defined as anyone with an interest in the debtor, to accept
less than they would otherwise be rightfully owed, with the difference
discharged as a matter of law. The ability to discharge debt is a primary
distinguishing factor between state law remedies and bankruptcy, one
actually captured in the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.
Pursuant to the Contracts Clause,61 states cannot pass laws "impairing the
Obligation of Contracts," which has been interpreted to prohibit state
insolvency laws that discharge debt. 62 Also prohibited by the Contracts
Clause are coerced alterations to the creditor's agreement with the debtor,
including the extension of time to repay debt, the refusal to perform under a
contract, or any other alteration of terms. Outside of bankruptcy, a debtor is
at the mercy of its creditors with regards to performance under the contract.
Accordingly, for many businesses, chapter 11 is a mechanism for
forcing negotiations with creditors, and for permitting debtors to continue to
manage and retain an ownership interest, often after previous efforts to
negotiate have failed. In this regard, bankruptcy provides valuable tools to
debtors that are unavailable in other contexts. These tools are intended to
facilitate a debtor's recuperation in a way that maximizes the return for
stakeholders-creditors, investors, and other parties in interest. 63 Although
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
See generally Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819); 7 C.J.S. Attachment §
506 (2016). For an interesting discussion on how a dispute over the Contracts Clause might
61

62

be considered the most important case of its millennium, see also Robert E. Shapiro, Back to
the Future: Ogden v. Saunders, 27 LITIG. 73, 74 (2001).
63 The extent to which chapter 11 policy should recognize the impact that a business's
bankruptcy should have on individuals who are not creditors is a matter ofwide dispute among
scholars. Compare, e.g., Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in Bankruptcy, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
233, 269 (2013) ("One of Chapter I1's primary purposes is to preserve jobs."); Richard V.
Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination of the Purposesand Goals ofBankruptcy, 2
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 269, 281-82 (1994) (noting that a business's going concern value
is only partly captured by the recovery it can provide for its creditors, and also comprises
relationships with non-creditor third parties, suggesting an independent bankruptcy interest in
preserving this value); Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing
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there are too many of such tools to permit a careful indexing of them allindeed, there are hornbooks and treatises dedicated to the topic-five stand
out as particularly useful for businesses seeking to reorganize in chapter 11,
particularly those attempting to respond to technological advances.
A.

The Automatic Stay

The automatic stay is usually the first bankruptcy tool debtors actively
use in their efforts to reorganize. The automatic stay arises as a matter of
law when a bankruptcy case is filed. 4 The stay renders void or voidable 65
any action taken to commence, continue, or enforce an action against the
debtor, or to obtain possession or a lien against the debtor's property. 6 6
Creditors are accordingly prohibited from exercising their legal rights during
the duration of the stay, even in cases where there is no dispute regarding
those rights.6 7 Creditors may petition the court for relief from the automatic
stay,6 which may be granted after notice and a hearing, but only upon a
showing that: (1) the creditor's interest in estate property is not adequately

on the Outside Looking in, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 429, 439 (1998), and Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policymakingin an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336 (1993) (arguing that
reorganization produces substantial positive externalities such as maintaining employment,
preserving the local tax base, and advancing community stability), with THOMAS H. JACKSON,
THE LOGIC AND LIMUTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 24 (1986) (arguing that bankruptcy law should
be limited to concerns of how to maximize the value of a given pool of assets, not to how
those assets should be distributed); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping,
and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 822 (1987) (arguing that the
rules determining loss distribution inside and outside bankruptcy should be the same,
suggesting no independent policy interest in the continuation of a failing debtor), and
CHRISTOPHER F. SYMES, STATUTORY

PRIORITIES IN CORPORATE

INSOLVENCY LAW: AN

ANALYSIS OF PREFERRED CREDITOR STATUS 70 (2008) (noting the dominance of the creditors'
bargain theory).
6 Both voluntary and involuntary, single and joint cases, give rise to the automatic stay.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
65 There is a difference of opinion as to whether all actions taken in violation of the
automatic stay are null and void ab initio or whether they must be voided by the court. The
majority takes the view that actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are without legal
effect, and cannot later be validated by a retroactive annulling of the automatic stay. See
CHARLES TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 246 (2d ed. 2009).

66 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The automatic stay technically applies to "property of the
estate," rather than property of the debtor. The filing of bankruptcy results in the creation of
a bankruptcy estate, which generally consists of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor.

See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012). Accordingly, it is technically incorrect, although practically
accurate, to describe the automatic stay as applying to all the debtor's property.
67 There are some exceptions to the automatic stay, found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b). These
exceptions include the commencement of a criminal action against the debtor, the withholding
of pension funds from a debtor's wages, and eviction proceedings in a case involving
residential property in which the lessor has obtained a judgment for possession, but do not
include generic efforts to repossess personal property, foreclose on homes, or otherwise obtain

judgments or liens. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(b).
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
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protected; 6 9 (2) the creditor should be allowed to move against a particular
piece of property because the debtor has no equity in the property and it is
not necessary to the debtor's reorganization; 70 or (3) the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors.71
Accordingly, because of the "automatic" nature of the stay and the necessity
for relief prior to taking action, whatever the underlying merits of the debt
or the likelihood of success in reorganization, a bankrupt debtor is
immediately afforded a period of "breathing room," where creditors cannot
take any action against the debtor to enforce the debt absent explicit
permission from the court.72
The benefits of the automatic stay to the debtor and the estate are
immediate and obvious. There are benefits to most creditors as well.
Because the stay prohibits all actions by all creditors (with some exceptions
as noted above), no creditor can improve his or her position at the expense
of other creditors. In the absence of a convincing reason justifying relief
from the stay, all creditors must wait for the orderly distribution of the estate,
either under the debtor's plan of reorganization or through liquidation.
Accordingly, state law rules that encourage a race to the spoils are preempted
by bankruptcy procedure, and creditors can be reassured that no one may
beat out the others as they all wait for the bankruptcy case to proceed.
B. Executory Contracts
A second powerful tool in the hands of a technologically bankrupt
debtor is the ability to reject unprofitable contracts and terminate wasteful
leases at an effective discount and, to some extent, on the debtor's timetable.
The act of filing for bankruptcy does not itself constitute a contractual
breach, even if the contractual instrument says as much; ipso facto clauses
purporting to terminate a debtor's property interest upon bankruptcy filing
are not enforceable in bankruptcy.7 3 Accordingly, contracts or leases that are
determined to be outstanding or "executory" 74 may be assumed or rejected
69 This argument is typically made in situations where the creditor has a security interest
in collateral that is rapidly depreciating in value. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
70 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
n' The ability to lift the automatic stay under this provision is limited to those creditors
with an interest in real property. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). The automatic stay may also be
lifted without cause 90 days after filing in cases where the debtor's estate consists primarily
or exclusively of a single piece of real property, which generates substantially all of the gross
income and on which no substantial business is being conducted. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(3),
101(51B). In certain situations involving repeat filers, the automatic stay may terminate early
or may not go into effect at all. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)-(4).
72 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
" See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B).
74 The debate over the "executoriness" of contracts is a quagmire that the author declines
to enter here. See, e.g., Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
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at the will of the debtor, subject to court approval. Although it is true that
all parties to a contract are free to continue or breach the contract at any
time,76 a debtor in bankruptcy has the advantage of treating the damages
arising from any breach as though they arose prior to the bankruptcy filing.
This means, of course, that the damages are considered pre-bankruptcy debt,
which can be repaid over time pursuant to a plan of liquidation or
reorganization, and discharged, in whole or in part, pursuant to that plan.77
Furthermore, in cases where the debtor seeks to assume a contract or lease,
any breach by the debtor in the days leading up to bankruptcy may be cured,
and the debtor may assume the contract or lease as though the breach had not
taken place.78

'

The debtor is frequently afforded a significant period of time in which
to decide whether or not to assume contracts and leases. Although a trustee
in chapter 7 must act within sixty days of the bankruptcy filing,79 in chapter
11, the debtor may decline to assume or reject until confirmation of the plan
of reorganization.80 There is no set time frame for plan confirmation, and
the timeline may extend for a year or more, giving the debtor the luxury of
time and the creditor the pain of uncertainty.8
The ability to assume beneficial contracts, even those the debtor may
have breached prior to filing, is an undoubtedly beneficial tool to a debtor
seeking to shift resources towards more valuable aspects of its business. But

Understanding "Rejection ", 59 U. COLo. L. REV. 845, 850 (1988) ("[I]n several respects
Countryman's analysis has clouded rather than clarified the law."); Vern Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 450 (1973) (noting that

"[a]ll contracts to a greater or less extent are executory," but asserting that such an expansive
meaning cannot be applied in bankruptcy); Morris G. Shanker, Bankruptcy Asset Theory and
its Application to Executory Contracts, 1992 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 3, 3 (describing the

situation surrounding the executory contract section of the Bankruptcy Code as "one
approaching legal chaos"); TABB, supra note 65, § 8.2.
7
The section refers to the powers of the trustee, but at least in chapter 11, the debtor in
possession has all rights and powers of the trustee, accordingly the terms are practically
synonymous. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 1107(a).
76 The nature of contract permits individuals to breach their contractual agreements, but
generally does not allow them to escape the consequences of that breach. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L.
REV. 991, 995 (1997) ("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.").
n See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
78 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1).
' See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1). The trustee may also request additional time from the
court, which the court may grant for cause shown. Id.
80 See 11 U.S.C. §365(d)(2).
8' See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984) (observing that the
difference between the liquidation and reorganization proceedings justifies a difference in
treatment for executory contracts, giving a debtor in reorganization greater latitude in deciding
whether to assume or reject).
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perhaps even more valuable is the ability to shed less profitable contracts and
leases at a fraction of the cost under state law. Although a debtor will be
responsible for damages arising from the debtor's breach of contract, these
damages will be paid out at a fraction and discharged along with the debtor's
other unpaid debts. This tool has permitted debtors to rid themselves of a
myriad of unprofitable arrangements, ranging from future contracts to
pension obligations. In rejecting these agreements, a debtor will often
transfer its own risk of loss onto its contracting partners, inflicting financial
pain on individual creditors for the benefit of the debtor and its estate and, at
least in theory, the creditors as a whole.
C. Asset Sales
A third advantage enjoyed by debtors in bankruptcy is the ability of the
bankruptcy trustee82 to sell property of the estate free and clear of liens,
typically in lieu of a foreclosure sale. Frequently, both inside and outside of
bankruptcy proceedings, an organization's assets are encumbered by
voluntary liens for the sake of obtaining financing, and occasionally by virtue
of a judicial lien imposed by a court judgment against the debtor. A lien
grants the lienholder the first right to the proceeds of any sale of the property.
For example, if a debtor's estate included equipment encumbered by a
security interest held by a bank, when the estate property was sold, the bank
would have a first priority right over the proceeds, until the debtor's debt to
the bank was satisfied. Similarly, if the debtor's estate included inventory
encumbered by a judicial lien entered in favor of a judgment creditor, when
the inventory was sold, the judgment creditor would have a first priority right
over the proceeds of the sale, until the judgment creditor's debt was satisfied.
More importantly, both the bank and the judgment creditor would
continue to hold property rights securing their respective interests until those
rights were extinguished by virtue of a foreclosure sale, or unless they
authorized a sale free and clear of their interests.83 Such a continuation of
rights permits secured creditors (a term typically used for those who reach a
consensual agreement with the debtor) and lien creditors (those who acquire
a judicial lien against the debtor) a degree of assurance that their interests
will be protected in the collateral until the collateral is sold. Outside of
bankruptcy proceedings, if a debtor is in default to a secured creditor, or any
time after a judicial lien has attached to collateral, the creditor holding the
82

In chapter 11, the trustee is more frequently the debtor in possession. See supra note

63.
83 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). There are some
exceptions to this rule, most notably for sales of goods in the ordinary course of business. See
U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010). In such cases, the buyer
would take free and clear of the security interest even with knowledge that the security interest
existed and was perfected.
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lien may look to the collateral for satisfaction of its debt. For secured
creditors, the collateral may be repossessed and sold pursuant to judicial
foreclosure, or through out-of-court proceedings in a "commercially
reasonable" manner, with surplus proceeds remitted back to the debtor.8 4 For
lien creditors, an officer of the court (typically the sheriff) conducts a sale of
the property and transmits the proceeds to the creditor, again remitting any
surplus to the debtor.
While court oversight of such sales may discourage the debtor from
absconding with sale proceeds, the nature of foreclosure sales also tends to
dramatically depress the sale price. Although the Supreme Court has
presumed that the price received at a foreclosure sale constitutes "reasonably
equivalent value" for the property, so long as all applicable state
requirements have been met, in practice foreclosure sale prices are often
"shockingly low." 8 6 As observed by one set of scholars, although many state
courts will set aside foreclosure sales that "shock the conscience," courts
may be surprisingly hard to shock.87 The "commercial reasonableness" of a
secured creditor's sale of personal property may also be challenged by a
debtor in court, although the standard does not require that the sale result in
a price that satisfies "fair market value." 88 Further, a finding that the sale
was not commercially reasonable does not unwind the sale; it only deprives
the creditor of the right to a deficiency judgment." Accordingly, a debtor's
ability to maximize the sale value of encumbered assets is limited pursuant
to state law.
In contrast, bankruptcy proceedings may provide debtors and creditors
with a sale mechanism that provides a greater return and fewer possibilities
for a post hoc challenge. Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a
trustee or debtor in possession may sell estate assets outside of the ordinary
84 Non-judicial sale is typically reserved for personal, not real property.
See U.C.C. §§
9-6 10; 9-615(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
85 See BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) ("We deem,
as the law has
always deemed, that a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably equivalent value,' for foreclosed
property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the requirements of
the State's foreclosure law have been complied with.").
86 LYNN M. LOPUCKI ET AL., SECURED TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
61 (8th ed.
2016).
87 Id.; see also First Bank v. Fischer & Frichtel, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 216, 221
(Mo. 2012)
(observing that Missouri has one of the strictest standards for setting aside sales, upholding
prices that came to only 20% to 30% of the fair market value); Amalgamated Bank v. Superior
Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, 689, 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (declining to set aside a foreclosure
sale for irregularities with factual findings that a $6.5 million building was sold at foreclosure
for $2,000); Am. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Hous. v. Musick, 531 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Tex. 1975)
(affirming a foreclosure sale of property valued at $338,365 for $20,000 on the ground that
there was no evidence of irregularity in the proceedings).
8
See U.C.C. § 9-627(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
89 See U.C.C. § 9-626(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
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course of business upon approval of the bankruptcy court, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing.90 These assets may be sold free and clear of
preexisting liens in the time frame that suits the debtor, not the creditor. By
virtue of the automatic stay, debtors are afforded time to market the assets,
permit inspection of those assets, and generate interest among multiple
buyers. The bankruptcy court provides a forum for auction of the assets,
with oversight by the judge herself. These sales, enjoying the oversight of
the bankruptcy court, are generally viewed as less susceptible to legal
challenge than a typical foreclosure or sale pursuant to the Uniform
Commercial Code. Given these advantages (marketing, inspection, and
court oversight), bankruptcy sales may fetch a higher price than would the
sale of the same assets in foreclosure. 91 This is particularly true when assets
may be sold as a group, or portions of the business sold as a going concern,
permitting the preservation of value in the course of the sale itself. 92
In some cases, liens may actually be stripped from property, such that
creditors who would have been treated as secured under state law find
themselves unsecured in bankruptcy. This typically occurs when creditors
have failed to obtain perfection of their security interest prior to the
bankruptcy filing. Creditors who are unperfected at the time of filing, and
in some cases, just before, 9 3 are treated as unsecured creditors by virtue of
the trustee's "strong-arm" powers, which permit a trustee (or debtor in
possession) to step in front of the security interest and distribute assets
accordingly. 94 Unlike secured creditors, unsecured creditors have no
guaranteed interest in the proceeds of collateral. Accordingly, the proceeds
of any sale of unsecured assets may be used to assist in the debtor's

90 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(e) (providing that a hearing
may be set "[i]f a timely objection is made," suggesting that courts need not set a hearing
without objection).
91 Challenges to the desirability of section 363 sales have largely focused on whether
such sales produce a higher value than reorganization. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W.
Doherty, BankruptcyFire Sales, 106 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 3 (2007) (finding in a study comparing
the sale of thirty public companies with the reorganization of 30 companies that companies
sold for an average of 35% of book value compared, but reorganized for an average of 80%
of book value); but see James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REv. 691 (2008)
(criticizing the methodology of the LoPucki & Doherty study as to the conclusions they draw
from the evidence).
92
The advantages of a court sale described here are part of what has led many debtors to
attempt a total liquidation of their businesses pursuant to section 363. See Jared A. Wilkerson,
Defending the CurrentState ofSection 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 595-96 (2007).
93 For example, pursuant to bankruptcy preference law, perfection of a pre-existing
security interest constitutes the transfer of value to or on behalf of a creditor, and can be
avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 547.
94 In situations where personal exemptions are applicable (usually not in the corporate
context) personal exemptions in property can also justify the stripping of even perfected
judicial liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
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reorganization, rather than being surrendered to satisfy the claims of the
newly-unsecured creditor.
D. DIPFinancing
A fourth bankruptcy advantage stems from the ability of bankruptcy
proceedings to alter or undercut contractual agreements between parties,
particularly, again, between a debtor and its secured creditors. As a general
matter, struggling companies require capital infusions to assist in
restructuring, reorganizing, and revitalizing their businesses. An unfortunate
side product of being heavily indebted to the point of requiring a bankruptcy
filing, is often a lack of cash reserves and an inability to borrow additional
money. Fortunately for debtors, bankruptcy law provides an opportunity to
solicit additional funds, and the ability to offer additional incentives to
would-be lenders that would be unavailable outside of bankruptcy.
The simplest bankruptcy tool regarding post-petition financing is the
ability to allow new lenders to take priority in repayment over old debt.95
Post-petition extensions of credit are treated as administrative expenses of
the bankruptcy estate, and receive top priority in repayment. 9 6 If this is
insufficient to attract new lenders, the court may also approve a lending
arrangement whereby the debtor can grant the lender priority over all other
administrative expenses, grant a security lien in unencumbered estate assets,
and/or grant a so-called "priming lien" on already-encumbered assets,
displacing pre-petition security interests.9 7 This ability provides a powerful
incentive for pre-petition lenders to provide post-petition financing as well,
or risk having their security interests downgraded to junior interests in
collateral encumbered by post-petition liens.
Other bankruptcy rules regarding a lender's security interest work to
backstop a debtor's ability to obtain post-petition financing. For example,
bankruptcy law negates any after-acquired clause in a lender's security
agreement or financing statement, such that property acquired by the debtor
after a bankruptcy filing within the description of the security agreement will
nonetheless be free of the lender's security interest. 98 Although a secured
creditor's interest in the proceeds of collateral is preserved in bankruptcy, it
is also subject to a bankruptcy court's determination of whether bringing
See 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2012).
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012). Administrative expenses do technically fall
behind domestic support obligations, but there is a carve-out for administrative expenses
incurred in the administration of assets used to pay such obligations. See 11 U.S.C. §
507(a)(1)(C). In any event, domestic support obligations are usually inapplicable in corporate
reorganizations.
9' See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) and (d). Debtors may also, with court approval, grant postpetition lenders a junior interest in encumbered property.
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a).
9
96
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assets into the banner of "proceeds" is consistent with "the equities of the
case." Creditors also face the possibility that the court, although typically
inclined to recognize such an interest in proceeds, could "order[]
otherwise." 99
E. Drawn Out and Reduced Repayment
Finally, bankruptcy permits debtors to repay their debts, both secured
and unsecured, over time, and also permits unsecured debts to be repaid at a
reduced rate. In chapter 11, the specific time period and amount for
repayment is left to the debtor to propose, with creditors voting in favor of
or against the debtor's proposal and the court confirming the plan of
reorganization based on that vote. With creditor support, the debtor may
propose a repayment plan stretching over years, if not decades. Unsecured
creditors may be paid mere pennies on the dollar for their claims. In the
meantime, the debtor can continue to function and operate the business.
The principal constraints on a debtor's proposed plan, aside from the
creditor vote, are requirements that similarly-situated creditors receive
similar treatment, that creditors who do not consent to the plan receive at
least what they would have gotten in liquidation, " that secured creditors are
paid in full,' 0 ' that the plan is "fair and equitable," 102 and that the plan is
feasible. If the debtor is unable to get all creditors1 0 3 to vote in favor of its
plan, the debtor must also meet the "absolute priority" requirement.1 0 4 Under
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also In re Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 400, 410
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003) ("[T]he Court finds that the equities of this case warrant a finding
that Bank Group's security interest does not flow to all cash generated by Debtors . ... To
grant Bank Group a blanket lien on all of Debtors' cash generated post-petition would
represent a windfall to Bank Group, in the face of Debtors' utilization of estate resources, i.e.
the services of their employees, to increase the value of Bank Group's collateral, and would
unfairly deplete the funds available for general unsecured creditors.").
100 This is a simplified explanation. What the law actually requires is that any class of
creditors that votes against the plan must receive what they would in a chapter 7 liquidation.
Debtors divide creditors into classes for purposes of voting on the plan, subject to the
constraint that all claims or interests in the class must be "substantially similar" to each other.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1122.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (2012). Secured debts must be repaid via cash
101
installments within five years, unless creditors have consented to alternative treatment under
the plan.
102 See generally § 1129.
103
Again, this is a simplification. The actual requirement is that the debtor get at least
two-thirds in number and more than one-half in total claims within each class of creditors to
vote in favor of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
104 See § 1129(b). This rule is subject to significant criticism for a variety of reasons.
See, e.g., Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in
Chapter II, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 759, 764 (2011) (arguing that the absolute priority rule
eliminates the contractual rights of the junior creditor by collapsing all interest in future values
of the company).
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absolute priority, creditors are ranked according to the priority of their rights
under state law to the debtor's assets, and no junior creditor is permitted to
recover against those assets until more senior creditors are paid in full. In
practice, this means that equity will recover nothing unless creditors are
repaid in full or voluntarily share a portion of their recovery. These legal
constraints on the plan of reorganization seek to strike the balance between
preserving the interests of lenders and enabling a struggling debtor to
regroup and succeed moving forward. The laws are generally perceived as
very generous to the debtor, and even more generous in implementation.
Taken altogether, these tools, protections, and allowances in
bankruptcy permit businesses both the space and the legal ability to
accomplish value preservation, and in many situations, to re-chart a negative
trajectory. Chapter 11 is intended to give companies the opportunity to
refocus their efforts on productive and profitable areas, expanding their
operations where economically feasible and eliminating ventures proved to
be unprofitable. In cases of technological disruption, chapter 11 can assist
businesses in shedding old, value-reducing mechanisms and investing in
more profitable mechanisms. Ideally, these adjustments should be made
incrementally, before old technology becomes obsolete, to avoid extreme
shocks to revenue or overhead. Bankruptcy can be a tool of last resort in
preserving a company if major adjustments become overdue, requiring a
more extensive and costly overhaul.
IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF BANKRUPTCY

Even the most useful bankruptcy tools, 0 5 in the hands of skilled
bankruptcy and insolvency professionals, cannot guarantee an outcome
where the debtor will emerge intact from the bankruptcy. In part, the success
of a company in chapter 11 will depend on whether it suffers from economic
distress, defined as weaknesses in the business model, or simply financial
distress, defined as cash flow or leverage issues. It is generally understood
that companies with poor business models are more likely to fail rather than
reorganize, although one type of distress can easily lead to the other. 106 The

105 Bankruptcy policy in chapter 11 is largely concerned with how to make such tools
more useful for reorganizing debtors without undermining the rights of creditors, a difficult
balance. See generally Michelle M. Harner, FinalReport ofthe ABI Commission to Study the
Reform of Chapter11, Am. BANKR. INST. (2014), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/
cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1 096&context-books.
106 See, e.g., Lemma W. Senbet & Tracy Yue Wang, CorporateFinancialDistress and
Bankruptcy: A Survey, 5 FOUNDS. & TRENDS INFIN. 243 (2010) (arguing that an efficient
bankruptcy code would reorganize firms suffering from financial distress but liquidate firms
suffering from economic distress); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating
Successful Failures, 66 FLA. L. REv. 205, 213 (2014) (noting that either type of distress may
lead to the other).
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failure to adjust to technological changes can cause economic distress,
because the company's goods and services become obsolete or lose their
demand. As a consequence, the company may then face financial distress.
Accordingly, failure to act in a timely fashion can prove fatal for a company.
Severe economic distress may necessitate a liquidation of the flawed
business model rather than a restructuring. However, weaknesses in the
business model do not necessarily make liquidation a foregone conclusion,
and it is possible for companies to successfully alter their business models,
or "pivot" in time to save the company.o 7 The relief provided by bankruptcy
might theoretically provide space for a company to pivot, although in
practice this is rarely the case. Companies are typically reluctant to file for
bankruptcy, despite the advantages that bankruptcy proceedings can provide,
until other means of reorganization have proved insufficient, or until it is
effectively too late to reorganize at all.108
It is not entirely clear why companies are so reluctant to file for
bankruptcy. At least one study has concluded that such reluctance may stem
from management's perception that distress is temporary, or from
management's refusal to acknowledge the challenges facing the company.109
Some may believe that the company can resolve its challenges pursuant to
out-of-court workouts, and may be wary of the costs of bankruptcy or
dubious of its benefits.' 10 It may be that decision makers view bankruptcy
only as a liquidation mechanism, despite evidence of other companies that
have emerged from a restructuring under chapter 11. Perhaps companies
seek to avoid the perceived stigma of a bankruptcy filing, believing (not
without cause) that a filing will serve as a public admission that the company
is struggling, with consequences that are likely to include a dramatic drop in
stock price and increased scrutiny of its operations.' 1 Ultimately, these
107 Eric Ries, author of The Lean Startup (2011), coined this term to mean "a change in
strategy without a change in vision." See Eric Ries, Pivot, don 't jump to a new vision,
STARTUP LESSONs LEARNED BLOG (June 22, 2009), http://www.startuplessonslearned.com/
2009/06/pivot-dont-jump-to-new-vision.html; see also Network Languages, Eric Ries
explains The Pivot, TEDED, https://ed.ted.com/on/7gLF8601.
08 See Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 208-10 (observing that management may be
slow to consider restructuring discussions, and be particularly reluctant to file for bankruptcy
because they view it as an "option of last resort"); Hamer, supra note 105, at 12.
109 Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 236 n. 118.
110 For example, it is a common perception that chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings are
unnecessarily expensive and time consuming. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Corporate
Bankruptcy: How Little We Know (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 2446663, June
5, 2014), https://ssm.com/abstract-2446663 (arguing that costs associated with chapter 11
fees are regulated for historical reasons and not because they are necessarily disproportionate
to the services provided).
11 But see Harner & Griffin, supra note 106, at 236 n.118 (finding in a study of
restructuring professionals that less than 15% of clients who resisted filing for bankruptcy did
so on account of the potential stigma associated with bankruptcy).
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concerns amount to a self-fulfilling prophecy-reluctance to file for
bankruptcy early enough to permit successful restructuring ensures that more
companies, when they do file, will have done so too late.
In the three cases listed below, large, profitable companies were unable
to move quickly enough to take advantage of technological advances that
fundamentally changed the way that the goods and services they supplied
were demanded by customers and clients. When customers ceased to shop
for books in stores and started purchasing reading material through online
stores or on digital media, Borders was too heavily invested in store fronts
to respond successfully to the shift. When customers stopped renting VHS
tapes from stores and instead purchased DVDs or had them mailed directly
to their homes, Blockbuster was too vested in its storefront service to
successfully adjust its business model in the face of strong competition.
Kodak became complacent in its profitable business model and neglected to
act until it was too late to transition smoothly away from its flagship products
to digital cameras. Presumably, if each industry had adjusted its model
earlier, before the technology moved out of its grasp, the outcome would
have been different, and a chapter 11 reorganization would have been more
successful or even avoidable altogether.
A.

BordersBookstore: Retail Book Sales in the Era ofE-Books and
Online Purchasing

Borders first gained its competitive advantage as a retail book store
through employing its own type of sophisticated, cutting-edge technology.
As a consequence, it was able to expand beyond its humble origins to become
a household name. At its height, it was the second-largest bookseller in
America, after Barnes & Noble.' 12 However, within a few decades of
Borders' rise, the sale of books and printed materials dramatically changed
with a confluence of technological advances, like the advent and popularity
of eBooks and the ability to order books online. Borders largely ignored
these advances for a significant period of time, even turning over its online
sales to a technological competitor-Amazon. As a consequence, Borders
was unable to recuperate when hit by the global economic crisis of 2008,
such that even its chapter 11 bankruptcy filing proved insufficient to permit
its ongoing survival.

112 CORPORATE DISASTERS: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY 49 (Miranda H. Ferrara
& Michele P. LaMeau eds., Gale, Cengage Learning 2012). Notably, Barnes & Noble, the

only surviving major bookstore chain in the U.S., is facing its own struggles with reinvention
in the era of Amazon. See Paul R. La Monica, Barnes & Noble reeling as Amazon eats its
lunch, CNN MONEY (Sept. 8, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/barnes-andnoble-earnings-amazon/.
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1. Beginnings
Opened in 1971 by two brothers, Tom and Louis Borders, Borders
Bookstore became competitive because of a software system developed by
Louis that allowed the store to manage inventory and accurately project
sales.11 3 By 1988, the brothers had turned management of the store over to
Robert DiRomualdo, who oversaw the expansion of the company and the
integration of music and movies into some of its stores, beginning in 1991.114
In 1995, Borders Group, Inc. went public on the New York Stock
Exchange.' '5 Borders' early embrace of technology was responsible for
much of its success. As noted by one publisher at the time, "[tihe Borders
6
inventory and reordering systems have been the envy of the industry.""
Borders continued to expand its physical storefronts, and launched its
first online retail presence, Borders.com, in May of 1998.' 1 In November
of 1999, Greg Josefowicz replaced DiRomualdo as CEO,"'8 and in August
of 2001 made the crucial decision to contract to sell its products through
Amazon, which had already been selling books online for about six years."'
In retrospect, this decision was arguably the greatest single cause for
Borders' downfall, but at the time, Borders' focus was on providing the
largest selection of books for its brick-and-mortar storefronts. In this regard,
Borders was very successful, beating out Barnes & Noble in terms of
selection and becoming known as the place to buy hard-to-find books.1 2 0

113

Nathan Bomey, Borders'Rise and Fall:A Timeline of the Bookstore Chain's 40-year

History, ANN ARBOR NEWS (July 18, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/business-review/
borders-rise-and-fall-a-timeline-of-the-bookstore-chains-40-year-history/.
114

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112; Bomey, supra note 113.

'15

Id.

Edwin McDowell, The Media Business; Revamping Set at Kmart Book Unit, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/30/business/the-media-businessrevamping-set-at-kmart-book-unit.html?scp=5&sq=borders%20group%20kmart&st=cse.
117 Bomey, supra note 113.
118 DiRomualdo had stepped down as CEO in November of 1998 in favor of Philip
Pfeffer, who resigned less than a year later. DiRomualdo replaced Pfeffer as CEO on a
temporary basis. Bomey, supra note 113.
116

119

BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 110

(2013) (noting that while this deal helped Borders to overcome its blunder of building a single
massive distribution facility rather than smaller, geographically dispersed warehouses, it
"delayed a necessary education on an important new frontier and ceded the loyalty of
[Borders'] customers to an aggressive upstart.").
120

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112.
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2. Fallout of Technological Innovation
The focus on brick-and-mortar stores would soon prove to be a bad
investment,121 and Borders' reluctance to make technological advances a
priority would prove a losing strategy. With the increasing ease of making
online purchases, Borders' focus on providing a wide selection at its large
superstores became a liability. In 2007, the company lost $157.4 million, 122
and stock shares plummeted in value. In March of 2008, Borders attempted
to boost its financial position by taking out a $42.5 million loan from
Pershing Square Capital Management, due on April 15, 2009.123 In May of
2008, Borders also severed its relationship with Amazon to launch its own
e-commerce Web site, a remake of the original Borders.com.1 24 In a late
move to catch up on a clear shift towards reading books in electronic format,
Borders also attempted to market an e-reader to compete with Amazon's
Kindle and Barnes & Noble's Nook. Rather than develop its own product,
Borders took partial ownership of a Canadian e-book company, Kobo.' 25 A
decade behind its competitors, Borders fared poorly in its efforts.1 2 6
Recognizing its shaky economic position, Borders attempted to market
itself for sale as a going concern throughout 2008, without success. 27 By
this point, the global financial crisis had begun and Borders' future was
deeply uncertain. Pershing Square granted a one-year extension on its
loan, 12 8 but Borders continued to post staggering losses. Borders admitted
to cash flow issues in early 2011, when it delayed payments to vendors and
landlords in order to conserve cash. 129 At this news, Professor John Pottow
predicted Borders' bankruptcy,1 30 which came roughly six weeks later on
121

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 50 ("The company did not appear to
understand how outdated the superstore model was becoming.").
122 Bomey, supra note 113.
123 Bomey, supra note 113.
124 Steve Pepple, Borders hopes new e-commerce web site will help turn financial
fortunes around, ANN ARBOR NEWS (May 27, 2008), http://blog.mlive.com/annarbomews/
2008/05/bordershopes new ecommercewe.html.
125

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 50.

126

In his book on Amazon, Brad Stone reports that one Borders executive, speaking
anonymously, reported the early version of Amazon was that it "was just another catalog-a
version of Lands' End." STONE, supra note 119, at 276. Borders' refusal to take the threat
from Amazon seriously undermined its ability to respond quickly enough.
127 Bomey, supra note 113.
128 Stefanie Murray, Borders reaches agreement with top shareholder
for loan extension,
ANN ARBOR NEWS (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.mlive.com/business/ann-arbor/index.ssf/
2009/03/bordersreachesagreement with.html.
129 Jim Milliot, Borders Delays JanuaryPayments, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Jan. 30, 2011),
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article/45953borders-delays-january-payments.html?utmsource=Publishers+Weekly%27s+PW+Daily

&utm campaign=7b83fb6a92-UA-15906914-1&utmmedium=email.
130

Nathan Bomey, Borders Group bankruptcy filing may be inevitable, University of
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February 16, 2011. At the time of filing, Borders operated 642 brick and
mortar stores in the United States. 13 1
3. Bankruptcy
In its chapter 11 filing, Borders listed its total assets at $1,275,430,500
The top 30 unsecured creditors
and overall debts of $1,293,112,600.
disclosed in the bankruptcy filings were all designated as "trade debt," and
consisted mostly of publishers like Penguin Putnam, Inc. (owed
$41,118,914.47) and Simon & Schuster, Inc. (owed $33,757,444.75).132
On the day of filing, Borders submitted an Emergency Motion seeking
authorization to close and sell the assets of 200-336 stores. 13 3 The proposal
was to "cut costs by closing highly unprofitable stores and restructuring
around a core group of favorably-performing stores." 34 Borders argued that
such a move would "ensur[e its] continued and stabilized viability." 3 5
Borders proposed that a coalition of three investment groups would act as a
stalking horse bidder for the sale of closing stores.1 3 6 The coalition proposed
to pay 73% of cost value of all merchandise at the store plus 50% of all net

Michigan expert says, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.annarbor.com/businessreview/borders-group-merger-or-bankruptcy-filing-inevitable-expert-says/.
131 Debtors' Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 554(a) and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 6006, 6007 and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of
Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain Property Effective as
of the Commencement Date at ¶ 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11 -bk-10614 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 23.
132

Voluntary Petition (Chapter 11) at Ex. A, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 1.
13
Debtors' Emergency Motion for Entry of Order (1) Authorizing the Debtors to Sell
Certain Assets Through Store Closing Sales and to Enter into Agency Agreement with (A)
Joint Venture Composed of Hilco Merchant Resources, LLC, SB Capital Group, LLC, and
Tiger Capital Group, LLC or (B) Other Successful Bidder at the Auction, (II) Approving
Stalking Horse Fee, (III) Authorizing Debtors to Abandon Unsold Property, (IV) Waiving
Compliance with Contractual Store Closing Sale Restrictions, (V) Exempting (A) State and
Local "Fast Pay" Laws and (B) Laws Restricting Store Closing Sales, and (VI) Granting
Related Relief at 3, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2011), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter Emergency Motion]; Declaration of Holly Felder Etlin In
Support of Store Closing Sale Motion at 3, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614,

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 10.
134

Emergency Motion at 2.
id.
136 A "stalking horse bid" is a term of art in bankruptcy sales. The bid places a floor on a
proposed asset sale, setting a minimum opening price for other potentially interested
purchasers. For an explanation for why the term is functionally inaccurate from a historical
perspective, see Stephen Sather, Shakespearefor Lawyers: Stalking Horse, AM. BANKR. INST.
J., May 1996, at 37 ("As used [in this context], the term 'stalking horse' is not an accurate
metaphor ... In its original context, a 'stalking horse' allowed a hunter to sneak up on its
quarry. However, in this usage, the stalking horse does not sneak up on anything; rather, it
135

flushes out higher bids.").

SE TON HALL LAW REVIEW

142

[Vol. 48:111

proceeds from sales of that merchandise.13 7
Another "first day" motion sought to reject unexpired leases associated
with some of the stores Borders proposed to close. 1 38 The motion identified
four outstanding leases for stores Borders had already closed. Borders
asserted that "marketing the [1]eases for assignment or sublease to a third
party would not generate any significant value for the estates"; however,
rejection and abandonment of the leases would save Borders an estimated
$22.7 million over their remaining terms. 139 Borders would later bring
another similar motion seeking to reject executory contracts.
Borders also sought court approval of a postpetition financing proposal,
under which the postpetition lenders would loan $505 million pursuant to a
"senior secured, superpriority priming loan"-that is, a senior security
interest in all Borders' postpetition collateral. 140 Prepetition secured lenders
would receive adequate protection in the form of a junior lien on Borders'
collateral, priority of payment as an administrative claim, and a funded
indemnity reserve up to $500,000.141 As required by statute,1 42 Borders
demonstrated that funding was not available any other way; virtually all
Borders' assets were subject to prepetition liens, and the lenders Borders had
approached were unwilling to issue credit as junior or unsecured creditors.1 43
These three motions, along with a variety of other motions relating to
administration of the estate and the continued operation of the company even
within bankruptcy,'" reflected Borders' exercise of a debtor's tools in
137

Emergency Motion at 3.
Debtors' Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 554(a) and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 6006, 6007 and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of
Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain Property Effective as
of the Commencement Date at ¶ 7, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 23.
138

'39

id.

Motion to Authorize Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. 105, 361, 362, 363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpeition Financing, (2)
Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority
Administrative Expense Status, (4) Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the
Automatic Stay, and (6) Scheduling a Final Hearing, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF No. 27.
141 Prepetition debt was tentatively calculated in Borders' Motion as "not less than
$196,050,000 and $33,699,708 of issued and outstanding letters of credit." Id.
142 See discussion supra note 88 and accompanying text.
143 Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 105, 361,
362, 363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing Use of Cash
Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Status, (4)
Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (6) Scheduling a Final
Hearing at 24-25, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2011), ECF No. 27.
1" For example, Debtors' motions to implement certain notice and case management
procedures, for authorization to pay employee obligations and continue employee benefit
140
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bankruptcy. With the automatic stay protecting Borders from creditors'
collection efforts, Borders began efforts to cut ties with old debts and slim
down outstanding obligations, as well as secure future financing, all with
45
greater ease and less cost than could be obtained outside of bankruptcy.1
As described by Borders' CFO, Scott Henry, Borders commenced the
chapter 11 case
to pursue an operational and financial restructuring, to restore and
revitalize Borders as the second largest chain of bookstores in the
nation, and to save thousands of jobs. Among other things, we
hope, through the approval of certain First Day Motions, to regain
access to capital that Borders sorely needs to remain viable, and
46
to shed approximately 200 stores that we cannot afford to keep.1
The court supported these goals: Borders' motion for approval of
47
The
postpetition financing was granted on an interim basis the next day.1
granted
was
to
auction
pursuant
stores
the
closing
of
assets
motion to sell the
the day after.1 48 The motion to reject unexpired leases took slightly longer,
but was also granted less than three weeks later.1 4 9
At the same time that Borders attempted to reorganize the company it
programs, and for continuation of deadlines to file schedules of assets and liabilities. See
generally In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011), ECF
Nos. 11, 12, and 14.
145 As explained above, supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text, asset sales conducted
with the oversight of the court permits the debtor greater control over the outcome of the sale,
while the rejection of unexpired leases in bankruptcy permits any default of the debtor to be
paid in "bankruptcy dollars," that is, whatever pro rata percentage the debtor ultimately pays
to unsecured creditors. Finally, the bankruptcy court can force previously senior secured
creditors to accept a downgrade in priority to make way for new estate financiers, a move that
could not be accomplished outside of bankruptcy without their consent.
146 Declaration of Scott Henry Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 in Support of
First Day Motions at 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
16, 2011), ECF No. 20.
147 Interim Order Granting Motion (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing
Use of Cash Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative
Expense Status, (4) Granting Adequate Protection, (5) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (6)
Scheduling a Final Hearing at 19, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2011), ECF Nos. 69, 2462. The final order, after the court heard objections,
was entered about a month later. See Final Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362,
363, 364 and 507 (1) Approving Postpetition Financing, (2) Authorizing Use of Cash
Collateral, (3) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administration Expense Status,
(4) Granting Adequate Protection, and (5) Modifying Automatic Stay, In re Borders Grp.,

Inc., No. 1:11 -bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011), ECF No. 404.
148

Order Approving Agency Agreement, Store Closing Sales and Related Relief at 6, No.

1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2011), ECF No. 91.
149 Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), and 554(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006, 6007
and 9014 Approving the Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases of Non-Residential Real
Property and Authorizing the Abandonment of Certain Personal Property Effective as of the
Commencement Date at 2, In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 4, 2011), ECF No. 258.
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also began considering a sale of the business as a going concern, pursuant to
the demands of unsecured creditors.150 On June 30th, a little over four
months into the bankruptcy, Borders filed a motion seeking approval of the
sale of substantially all assets free and clear of all liens to a pre-specified
stalking horse bidder, Najafi Companies, for $215 million.151 Multiple
creditors filed objections, most notably, the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (OCC). 152 The OCC indicated that, although it would
not object to the sale of substantially all of Borders' assets through a going
concern sale, the proposed agreement permitted the buyer to liquidate the
assets immediately upon sale, such that the arrangement "neither maximizes
value for the benefit of unsecured creditors nor provides for the other benefits
of a going concern-preservation of the business and the thousands of jobs
that go along with that business."' 5 3 In other words, the buyer in the sale
would take advantage of whatever value was contained in the raw assets of
the company. The buyer was not buying Borders as a continuing entity, only
the company's physical assets.
The court agreed with the OCC, and following a court-supervised
auction with no bidders, Borders was sold to the stalking horse buyer
preferred by the OCC, one who specialized in the winding down and
piecemeal sale of companies. 15 4 As of July 21, Borders' reorganization had
officially become a liquidation.
4. Going Concern Value
Although the original intent was to restructure the company by closing
150 See Notice of Hearing on Debtors' Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections
105, 363
and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 6006 and 9014 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure (I) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets
Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests and the Assumption and
Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases Related Thereto, (II) Approving
the Sale Procedures and Break-Up Fee, and (III) Granting Related Relief, In re Borders Grp.,
Inc., No. 1:11-bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2011), ECF No. 1130.
''
Id.; Michael J. De La Merced, Borders Faces Liquidation After Takeover Bid's
Rejection, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/bordersfaces-liquidation-after-takeover-bids-rej ectionthe-borders-group-was-dealt-a-potentially-leth
al-blow-on-wednesday-when-a-committee-of-its-unsecured-creditors-rejected-a-proposed-ta
keover-by/?ref-business&_r-0.
152 Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Bid Procedures and
Break-Up Fee Contained in the Debtors' Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363
and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules 2002, 6004, 6006 and 9014 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure (I) Approving the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets
Free and Clear of All Liens, Claims, Encumbrances and Interests and the Assumption and
Assignment of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases Related Thereto, (II) Approving
the Sale Procedures and Break-Up Fee, and (III) Granting Related Relief at 3, In re Borders
Grp., Inc., No. 1:11 -bk-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2011), ECF No. 1216.
153

Id.

154

De La Merced, supra note 151.
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unprofitable stores and transitioning to a focus on electronic offerings, it
soon became apparent that the contribution of the company was the provision
of services that proved to be totally obsolete, easily replicated by others, and
available at a lower cost than Borders could provide. The market in which
Borders had sought to compete changed dramatically over the course of its
existence, and the company simply failed to adjust to the change. Its
downfall was compared by analysts to the death of the dinosaurs, "swept up
in forces they were not prepared for and did nothing to prevent."' 55
Borders' enormous storefronts, stocked with literature that was difficult
to find, could not compete with the ease of online purchases, or the
accessibility of text through electronic devices. What is more, the stores
were staggeringly more expensive to maintain. Borders' failure to invest in
electronic technologies, notably the online sales of books and the provision
of electronic books, completely undermined its ability to compete in the age
of the internet.1 56 Whatever value Borders could provide as a going concern
was eroded over time, such that, by the point it filed for bankruptcy, there
was no real value to exploit apart from the simple liquidation of its assets.
In other words, the cost to bring an outdated behemoth such as Borders into
the 21st century was too much to justify preservation of the Borders name.1 5 7
B. Blockbuster: From Renting VHS to DigitalStreaming
Blockbuster's history suggests a watershed moment, when the
company could have and should have altered its business model in such a
way to embrace the transition of the movie rental business from a strictly
hard-copy, in-store model to one that would allow for mailing and streaming
media over the internet. Unfortunately for Blockbuster, other forces
prevailed. A shareholder proxy fight was waged over the issue of what
direction the company would take, and this resulted in a decision to retrench
in established business practices rather than adjust to a changing market.
Early abandonment of new technologies would later prove disastrous for the
company's long-term prospects.
1. Beginnings
Blockbuster Video was opened in 1985 by husband and wife team
155

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 51.

See Ben Austen, The End of Borders and the Future of Books, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 10, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201 111-1 0/the-end-of-borders-and-the-future-of-books.
157 Borders' failure did open space for the revival of many smaller independent bookstore
owners, who were able to capitalize on the market for physical storefronts while
simultaneously integrating the demand for e-books. See Austen, supra note 156 (quoting the
owner of Parnassus, an independent bookstore, as saying, "We're building our store from the
bones of the superstores.").
156
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David and Sandy Cook, leasing movies on videotapes to individuals that they
could watch on their personal videocassette recorders (VCRs).'" At the
time, VCRs were widely owned, and increasingly available to average
households.' 59 Most people rented movies from small local video rental
stores, and doing so was the only real alternative to going to a movie theater.
Blockbuster's initial strength was in its inventory of cassettes, which
dramatically exceeded those of contemporary competitors, and in its use of
barcodes, magnetic strips, and computers to keep track of inventory,
discourage theft, and facilitate checkout.' 60 The variety of selection
Blockbuster was able to offer quickly translated into significant profits and
growth. Early expansion meant that Blockbuster had nearly 400 stores by
1988, only three years after its formation.161
Before Blockbuster's tenth anniversary, the chain would have more
than 3,400 stores, and had begun to partner with movie studios in promoting
and advertising particular films. 16 2 In 1994, Blockbuster merged with
Viacom and began experimenting with sales of other products, such as
snacks, t-shirts, magazines, CDs, and toys.' 6 3 Competition from other big
names such as Hollywood Video and even Wal-Mart restricted overall
profits, and in 1996, Blockbuster experienced a new challenge-a change in
format from cassettes to DVDs. For Blockbuster, this required a wholesale
turnover in inventory to reflect the new format. It also meant the emergence
of a new competitor, which quickly capitalized on the technological advance.
2. Fallout of Technological Innovation
Netflix, Inc., one of the pioneers of the new DVD market, was formed
in 1997 with the business model of subscribing customers to rent DVDs by
mail.'
The slim and durable design of the DVDs, especially as compared
to the bulky VHS cassettes, made this proposal economically feasible, as the
DVDs could be more safely and inexpensively delivered and returned.
Although initially the market for DVD rentals was small, limited to those
who could afford the more expensive DVD players, by 2003, Netflix had

' CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 154.
159 In 1985 an estimated 11.5 million VCRs were sold in America, with prices from $200
to $400. See Johnnie L. Roberts, The Ver Boom: Prices Drop As TheirPopularity Continues
To Grow, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 1985), reprinted in http://articles.chicagotribune.com/198509-22/news/8503040687_I _vcr-boom-suppliers-marketers.
160 CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 108, at 154.
161 Id. at 154.
162 Id. at 155.
163 Id.
16 Jeffrey M. O'Brien, The Netflix Effect, WIRED (Dec.
https://www.wired.com/2002/12/netflix-6/.

1, 2002, 12:00 PM),
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acquired more than one million subscribers.' 65 Netflix had already acquired
revenue sharing agreements with movie producers that permitted it to
purchase DVDs at a reduced rate in exchange for a cut of rental receipts, and
had begun to acquire large numbers of independent and hard-to-find videos
that would not be available at most video stores.1 6 6
From the consumer perspective, Netflix eliminated the need to travel to
a storefront to get a desired DVD, which could be ordered online in
advance.' 6 7 In addition, Netflix, pursuant to its subscription model,
permitted customers to keep a DVD as long as desired, with the caveat that
no further DVDs would be issued before it was returned.1 6 8 Netflix also
incorporated technology known as CineMatch, which allowed subscribers to
rate the movies they viewed and receive recommendations of movie titles
similar to those they liked.1 6 9 The ability to easily request additional, similar
titles expanded customers' tastes beyond what was immediately popular, at
a cost-savings to Netflix, as box office hits typically require larger revenuesharing than other movies.1 70
Recognizing the competitive threat from Netflix, Blockbuster moved to
adopt several of the Netflix innovations in 2004. 171 However, it continued
to see a slide in rentals as more people became Netflix subscribers and/or
began purchasing their own collection of DVDs from Amazon or WalMart.1 72 In spite of these numbers, CEO John Antioco was optimistic about
Blockbuster's future, proposing to spend $200 million to launch Blockbuster
Online, an online DVD subscription. 173 He also eliminated late fees for instore rentals, a popular move among customers, but at the cost of another
$200 million to the company.1 7 4 These expenditures were controversial
among Blockbuster shareholders and sparked a proxy fight.175 Investor Carl
Icahn launched the challenge in 2005, and was able to successfully bring
himself onto the board of directors.1 7 6 After the board clashed with Antioco
165
166

167
168
169

CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112,

at 155.

Id.
O'Brien, supra note 160.

Id.
Id.

170 Id.
1'
Stephen Gandel, How Blockbuster Failed at Failing, TIME (Oct. 17, 2010)
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022624,00.html.
172 John Antioco, How I Did It: Blockbuster's Former CEO on Sparring with an Activist
Shareholder, HARV. Bus. REV. (Apr. 2011) https://hbr.org/2011/04/how-i-did-it-bloc
kbusters-former-ceo-on-sparring-with-an-activist-shareholder#comment-167712680;
CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 155.
173 Antioco, supra note 172.
174 Id.
175
176

Id.
id-
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over salary, he stepped down as CEO in 2007.' At roughly the same time,
Blockbuster collided with yet another form of technologically innovative
competition.
Redbox Automated Retail, LLC began placing DVD rental kiosks in
2002, and by 2007 had more than 6,000 kiosks in restaurants, grocery stores,
and shopping malls around the country.' 7 8 These kiosks permitted customers
to reserve DVDs online and then pick them up at the kiosk, renting them by
the day, with the ability to return the DVD at any convenient time.1 7 9
Customers could also peruse availability at the kiosk, which compared in
expense to a Blockbuster store the way a vending machine might compare to
a grocery store, with no full-time employees and minimal expenses for leases
or utilities. What Redbox lacked in variety it compensated for in ease and
convenience, and it quickly became one of the largest rental services in the
nation.' 80
Unable to keep up with these developments, an early competitor of
Blockbuster and another store-based rental model, Hollywood Video, filed
for bankruptcy in 2007.181 Blockbuster's response, under new CEO Jim
Keyes, was to shift focus back to its in-store business, raising prices for
online rentals and losing scores of customers as a result.' 8 2 In early 2009,
Blockbuster launched its own line of vending kiosks, building a base of over
6,000 kiosks by 2010.183 It also augmented its by-mail subscription program
by permitting customers to exchange online movie rentals for in-store
movies. 84
But Blockbuster continued to lose market share to its competitors. In
2008, Netflix began to offer movie streaming services to subscribers, who
could stream movies directly from the internet.' 85 At this time, Netflix was
generating $115 million in profit, while Blockbuster was recording losses of
$517 million.' 8 6 In 2009, Blockbuster closed nearly 1,000 of its stores
(which by then numbered more than 7,000) and took other steps to reduce
'in

Id.

178

CORPORATE DISASTERS,

supra note 112, at 156.
Kim Iskyan, Here's a look back at one of CarlIcahn'sgiganticmistakes, Bus. INSIDER
(May 3, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/carl-icahns-blockbuster-mistake-2016-5.
"s0 CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 156.
179

181

2010),

Associated Press, Hollywood Video owner files for bankruptcy, NBCNEWS (Feb. 3,

http://www.nbcnews.com/id/35222092/ns/business-usbusiness/t/hollywood-video-

owner-files-bankruptcy/#.WKcmpPkrKM8.
182 Antioco, supra note 172.
183 Todd Davis & John Higgins, A Blockbuster Failure:How an OutdatedBusiness
Model
Destroyed a Giant, CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY CASE STUDIES 160 (2013) at 5,
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utkstudlawbankruptcy/1 1.
184

Id.
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CORPORATE DISASTERS, supra note 112, at 156.
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general and administrative expenses, in addition to refinancing transactions
and freeing up cash.1 8 7 These steps proved inadequate to curb financial
problems. Blockbuster began to struggle with illiquidity, and share prices
for Blockbuster stock dropped until July 7, 2010, when Blockbuster was
delisted from the New York Stock Exchange.' 88 Blockbuster filed for
chapter 11 on September 23, 2010, only a few months after Hollywood
Video initiated liquidation proceedings.1 8 9
3. Bankruptcy
Blockbuster Inc. filed its chapter 11 petition joined by a dozen sister
corporations, including Blockbuster Canada, Blockbuster International
Spain, and Blockbuster Video Italy.1 90 Blockbuster's listed assets topped $1
billion, but its liabilities exceeded $1.5 billion.19' Blockbuster's petition
listed unsecured claims topped by over $300 million in bond debt, followed
by a series of smaller trade debts to various studios, ranging from $21 million
to just over $162 thousand.1 9 2 Secured debt, to the tune of about $630
million,1 93 was in the form of Senior Secured Notes, with an interest in "all
assets of the debtors." 94
The petition included an affidavit from newly-appointed Chief
Restructuring Officer Jeffery J. Stegenga, who blamed Blockbuster's
financial challenges on the general economic recession and the rise of
competitive alternatives to Blockbuster's products, along with
"unsustainable levels of debt."' 9 5 Stegenga later described in detail how
"technological advances" along with "changing consumer preferences" and
Id.; Davis & Higgins, supra note 183.
Affidavit of Jeffery J. Stegenga Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 in Support
of First Day Motions at 13, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
187
188

Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 3. [hereinafter Stegenga Affidavit].
Voluntary Petition (Chapter 11), In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr.
18
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 1. Roughly 40% of Blockbuster stores were outside the

United States at the time of filing.
190

Id. Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 51.

I91

Id.

Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 55.
Different filings differ on the precise number. See Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188,
at 14; Voluntary Petition, supra note 189, at 6.; Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order, on an
interim and Final Basis, (I) Authorizing the Debtors to Obtain Postpetition Superpriority
Financing Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 364(c), 364(d)(1), and 364(e), (II)
Authorizing Debtors' Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363, (IH) Granting Liens
and Superpriority Claims to DIP Lenders Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364, (IV) Providing
Adequate Protection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364, and (V) Scheduling a
Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 4001(b), 4001(c) and 6004, In re BB
Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 16
[hereinafter Motion for Entry of an Order].
194 Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 63.
192

193

195

Id. at 15.
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"the rapid growth of disruptive new competitors" had "changed the
landscape of the industry."l 9 6 Demonstrating significant self-awareness, he
further noted that competitors, using alternative distribution methods, had
garnered market share and eroded Blockbuster's "traditional 'brick and
mortar' retail store based customer market."' 9 7 He observed, "[w]hile
Blockbuster has successfully launched its own channels of distribution in the
by-mail and . .. vending kiosk markets, the revenues and profits from these
new channels have not offset the negative economic results from the reduced
traffic within, and downsizing of, its traditional store-based channel."l 9 8
In the same document, Stegenga put forth a set of restructuring goals,
indicating that Blockbuster had already begun to document a recapitalization
transaction structure, arranged for DIP financing, and established contractual
terms with movie studios going forward.1 99 Through pre-bankruptcy
negotiations, Blockbuster entered chapter 11 with a "Plan Support
Agreement," which had the support of 80% of secured creditors. 20 0 The plan
would convert debt into equity and provide Blockbuster with fresh capital
"to effect a restructuring that will maximize value and assure Blockbuster's
long-term viability."201
With these goals in mind, Blockbuster raised first day motions seeking,
among other things, authorization to grant postpetition financing by
superpriority priming 202 old secured debt to the amount of $125 million. 2 0 3
A motion to reject unexpired leases followed the next day.2 04 The debtor's
motion for postpetition financing was granted (albeit on an interim basis)
almost immediately.2 05 An order on the debtor's motion regarding the
rejection of unexpired leases was delayed subject to an objection, but
196
1
198

199

200

Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 24-25.

Stegenga Affidavit, supra note 188, at 25.

201

Id.

202

See supra note 92.

203

Motion for Entry of an Order, supra note 193, at 3.
Motion to Approve / Debtor's Omnibus Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and
554(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6006, 6007, and 9014 for Approval of Rejection of Certain
Unexpired Leases of Non-Residential Real Property and Authorization to Abandon Certain
Property Effective as of the Commencement Date, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 10-14997cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010), ECF No. 73 [hereinafter Omnibus Motion].
205 Bridge Order () Authorizing Postpetition Superpriority Secured Financing Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 361, 362, 364(c)(2), 364(c)(30, 364(d)(1) and 364(e), (II) Authorizing
Postpetition Use of Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §363, (III) Granting Adequate
Protection Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 363 and 364 and (IV) Scheduling a Final
Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 4001(b) and 4001(c), In re BB Liquidating Inc., No.
1:10-bk-14997-cgm (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010), ECF No. 74 [hereinafter Bridge
Order].
204
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approval was granted roughly four weeks later.206
Given that Blockbuster had the pre-negotiated agreement with senior
lenders and the support of the bankruptcy court in its proposed use of
bankruptcy tools, it was not unreasonable to expect a successful
reorganization.207 However, the bankruptcy quickly stalled, as business
continued to decline and the debtor was unable to reach an agreement with
its post-petition financiers. 2 08 After being granted two extensions of time to
file a plan, Blockbuster ultimately requested, and was granted, the ability to
sell substantially all of its assets to Dish Network Corporation pursuant to
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. 20 9 The sale transferred all stores and
operations to the buyer, leaving Blockbuster an empty shell "with no ongoing
operations and only one remaining employee." 2 10 Blockbuster changed its
name to BB Liquidating Inc. and converted its chapter 11 reorganization to
a chapter 7 liquidation.2 11
4. Going Concern Value
Dish Network invested roughly $320 million in its purchase of
Blockbuster's assets and its brand.212 Dish then quickly used the Blockbuster
streaming service to boost its own satellite TV plans and attempt to compete
with Netflix streaming services.213 However, Blockbuster's strength was
still in its hard-copy (rather than digital) library, with more than 100,000
available titles on DVD compared with 3,000 to 4,000 available to stream. 2 14
206 Order Establishing and Authorizing Procedures for the Rejection of Unexpired Leases
of Nonresidential Real Property, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2010) ECF No. 362.
207 Blockbuster indeed had every expectation of a quick plan confirmation. See Notice of
Hearing Regarding Debtor's Motion, Pursuant to Section 1112(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
and Bankruptcy Rules 101 7(f) and 1019, to Convert their Chapter 11 Cases to Cases under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code at 3, In re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1: 10-bk-14997 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013), ECF No. 2856 [hereinafter Notice of Hearing].

208

id

See Debtors' Emergency Motion, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 and Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, 6004, and 9014, for Entry of a Supplemental Order Approving
Amended and Restated Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement By and Among Blockbuster, Inc.,
the Debtor Subsidiaries Party Thereto, and Dish Network Corporation, In re BB Liquidating
Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) ECF No. 1692; Supplemental
Order, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105 and 363 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 4001, 6004, and
9014, Approving Amended and Restated Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement By and Among
Blockbuster, Inc., The Debtor Subsidiaries Party Thereto, and Dish Network Corporation, In
re BB Liquidating Inc., No. 1:10-bk-14997 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2011) ECF No. 1723.
209

210

id.

Notice of Hearing, supra note 207.
Ryan Lawler, So Why Did Dish Really Buy Blockbuster?, GIGAOM (Apr. 6, 2011, 6:33
AM) https://gigaom.com/2011/04/06/dish-blockbuster-acquisition/.
213 id.
214 See Matt Bums, Blockbuster Movie Pass: Dish Network's $10/Month Answer to
211
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Customers did not latch on to the advertised ability to return videos in-store
the way that promoters had hoped, and within two years of its purchase, after
gradually shutting lower-performing stores, Dish Network announced that it
would close all remaining Blockbuster Video retail locations, laying off
nearly 3,000 employees.2 15
Former investor Icahn, who initially resisted Antioco's shift toward
more digital offerings, is reported to have lost nearly $200 million in the
company.216 In the HarvardBusiness Review, he described Blockbuster as
"the 'worst investment' he ever made." 2 17 He went on to say, "It failed
because of too much debt and changes in the industry. It had too many stores,
Netflix created a better business model, and then Redbox kiosks and the
whole digital phenomenon eliminated the need for consumers to go to a
separate DVD store." 218 In his statement, Icahn does not acknowledge that,
as winner of the proxy fight, he was ideally situated to prevent Blockbuster's
disastrous loss of value due to declining assets in a time of changing
technology.
C. Kodak: ProtectingOld Investments By Abandoning New Ideas
1. Beginnings
The Eastman Kodak Company was founded in 1888, and over the
course of a century became a household name and an industry giant.219
Known for its pioneering technology and innovative marketing, 220 Kodak
created and sold inexpensive household cameras, along with the film,
chemicals, and paper required to develop photographs.22 1 It developed a
successful marketing campaign encouraging individuals to capture that
"Kodak Moment" by preserving images of daily life on film. 22 2 The term
Netflix, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 23, 2011) https://techcrunch.com/2011/09/23/blockbustermovie-pass-dish-networks-answer-to-netflix-and-qwikster/.
215 Liana B. Baker, Dish Network to close all Blockbuster stores, lay off 2,800, REUTERS
(Nov. 6, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blockbuster-dish-idUSBRE9A511Z

20131106.
216 Kim Iskyan, Here's a look back at one ofCarl Icahn'sgiganticmistakes, Bus. INSIDER
(May 3, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/carl-icahns-blockbuster-mistake-2016-5.
217 Jeanine Poggi, Icahn:Blockbuster 'Worst Investment' I Ever Made, THESTREET (Mar.
21, 2011), https://www.thestreet.com/story/ 1053480/1/icahn-blockbuster-worst-investment
-i-ever-made.html.
218 id.
219 The last Kodak moment?, EcONOMIST (Jan. 14, 2012), http://www.economist.com/

node/21542796.
220

Id.

221

Id.

222 See Deborah L. Jacobs, What Will Become of The 'Kodak Moment'?,
FORBES (Jan. 19,

2012),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahjacobs/2012/01/19/what-will-become-of-the-

kodak-moment/#44c4fb295c29.
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eventually became part of the popular lexicon, meaning "[a] sentimental or
charming moment worthy of capturing in a photograph." 22 3 Following the
company's spectacular demise, the slang came to also mean "[t]he situation
in which a business fails to foresee changes within its industry and drops
from a market-dominant position to being a minor player or declares
bankruptcy." 22 4
In 1976, Kodak accounted for 90% of film sales and 85% of camera
sales in America, and was regularly rated one of the world's five most
valuable brands.225 One year earlier, in 1975, the company had built one of
the first digital cameras.22 6 Rather than fully develop the technology, Kodak
dropped it, reportedly out of fear that it would threaten the photographic film
business it had built up.2 2 7 Within a few years, Kodak became distracted by
challenges from Fujifilm, a Japanese competitor, and competition with Fuji's
lower-priced alternative came to dominate its market outlook.228 Kodak's
frustration with cheap Japanese film even led to trade friction between
America and Japan during the 1990s, to the point that the United States
issued a complaint against Japan to the World Trade Organization, without
success.229

2. Fallout of Technological Innovation
When digital products began to gain traction in the market in the mid1980s, Kodak integrated digital features into its product lines. 2 30 This
approach seemed to serve it well, and in 1996, revenues peaked at nearly $16
billion. 2 3 ' Kodak profits peaked a few years later, reaching $2.5 billion in
1999.232 Throughout this time period, however, consumers began to switch
23 3
in ever-growing numbers to digital cameras, even in third-world countries.
In middle-class China, for example, many consumers purchased digital
cameras first, skipping the older film models entirely. 234 Kodak continued
to participate in the digital market, and by 2001, it was the second largest
223 Kodak

moment,

WIKITIONARY

(July

27,

2016),

https://en.wiktionary.org/

wiki/Kodak moment.
224 Id.

225 See The last Kodak moment?, supra note 219.
226

Id.
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Id.
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See Michael Hiltzik, Kodak's Long Fade to Black, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011),
http://articles.1atimes.com/201 1/dec/04/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20111204.
229 See The last Kodak moment, supra note 219.
230 See Hiltzik, supranote 228.
231 See The last Kodak moment, supra note 219.
232 id.
233 See id.
234 This was unfortunate for Kodak, which had been relying on China as an emerging
market. See LUCAS, JR., supra note 2, at 16.
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235

seller of digital cameras.
However, Kodak had already begun to lose money on the digital camera
model, which did not require the additional film, chemical, and paper
products their older cameras had. Beginning around 2001, film sales began
to fall 20-30% per year.2 36 Many photos taken during that time period were
never developed, but rather were saved in digital form on computers or other
devices. As people began to take more and more pictures using cell phones
and other devices rather than digital cameras, Kodak's share of the market
shrunk even more.237 Although Kodak developed and then humored the
digital camera, it did not envision or anticipate that digital cameras would
entirely replace what had been, up to then, Kodak's "razor and blades"
(camera and film) approach to picture taking.238
Many within Kodak pushed for greater recognition of the digital market
early on. Larry Matteson, a former Kodak executive, wrote a report in 1979
detailing the ways in which the market would switch from film to digitalbeginning with the government, then professional photography, and then the
market at large, by 20 10.239 But the profit on digital cameras paled in
comparison to the profit on film.
Matteson reported that: "Wise
businesspeople concluded that it was best not to hurry to switch from making
70 cents on the dollar on film to maybe five cents at most in digital."2 40
Although it was true that Kodak could make substantially more in the shortterm under the old model, failure to adjust to the new technology spelled
disaster in the long run. 24 1
By 2003, only a few years out from Kodak's peak performance, the
company announced that it would halt investing in traditional film in light of
plummeting demand.242 Instead, under the leadership of CEO Antonio M.
Perez, Kodak began investing in inkjet printers and patent lawsuits, drawing
on its formidable library to target companies like LG and Sony, among
others.243 The company reduced its workforce by approximately 75% from
See Hiltzik, supra note 228.
Quentin Hardy, At Kodak, Clinging to a FutureBeyond Film, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/business/at-kodak-clinging-to-a-future-beyond
-film.html.
237 See Hiltzik, supra note 228.
235

236

238

Id.

239

See The last Kodak moment?, supra note 219.

240

Id.

See LuCAS, JR., supra note 2, at 24.(quoting Carly Fiorina's observation that Kodak
"protected its franchise for as long as it could" and only entered digital photography "when it
was completely obvious to everyone that the old model simply would not survive").
242 De La Merced, supra note 151.
243 Id.; Marius Meland, Kodak Sues Sony Over Digital Camera Patents, LAW360 (Mar.
10, 2004), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/1094/kodak-sues-sony-over-digital-camerapatents. These lawsuits were responsible for billions of dollars of revenue in the years leading
241
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2003 to 201 1.244 Revenue did not meet expectations, however, 2 45 and in a
last-ditch effort to avoid bankruptcy, Kodak announced the sale of its digital
imaging patents in 2011, suggesting the company intended to abandon the
digital photography market altogether. 246 In the absence of sufficiently
interested buyers, Kodak filed for bankruptcy protection on January 19,
2012.247

3. Bankruptcy
Kodak listed $5.1 billion in total assets and $6.75 billion in debts on its
chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. 24 8 In its preliminary statement accompanying

the filing, Kodak blamed its liquidity issues on difficulties in collecting
licensing fees from infringers of its intellectual property, as well as
substantial legacy costs, particularly costs associated with post-employment
benefits for thousands of retired Kodak employees. 249 It indicated that its
primary motivation in filing for bankruptcy protection was to obtain
postpetition DIP finance ,250 and consistent with this desire, filed a motion
pursuant to Section 364 to borrow $950 million secured by estate property. 2 5 1
Kodak proposed to offer DIP lenders the highest protection possible:
superpriority, priming liens, and the ability to "roll-up" prepetition lien
debt.252 The same day, Kodak also filed motions to reject unexpired aircraft

up to bankruptcy. See Affidavit-Declaration of Antoinette P. McCorvey at 3, In re Eastman
Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 2 [hereinafter
McCorvey Affidavit].
244 Kodak went from having approximately 63,900 employees in 2003 to roughly 17,000
employees by the time of its bankruptcy filing in 2011. See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note
243, at 3.
245 This was in part due to flawed estimates in the market for film. As acknowledged by
Kodak, the company had anticipated a 20% decline in film sales between 2008 and 2010,
which was roughly half of the actual decline. See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 14.
246 De La Merced, supra note 151.
247 In re Eastman Kodak Co., Case No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012),
ECF No. 1.
248

Id.

See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 13. Kodak listed the Kodak Pension Plan
of the United Kingdom as its largest unsecured creditor, with a claim that was as-yet
undetermined. Statement-Notice of Filing of Amended Consolidated List of Creditors
Holding 50 Largest Unsecured Claims at 4, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 80.
250 See McCorvey Affidavit, supra note 243, at 5.
251 Motion to Approve Debtor in Possession Financing at 3-4, In re Eastman Kodak Co.,
No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 16.
252 Id. at 5-6, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2012), ECF No. 16. A "roll-up" permits a post-petition lender to shift its pre-petition
unsecured debt into post-petition administrative debt, thereby making repayment significantly
more likely.
249
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leaseS 2 5 3 and nonresidential real property leases,254 as well as various
executory contracts.25 5
Kodak's bankruptcy motions were resisted by creditors who accused
them of "burning the furniture"-selling off valuable assets in one-time cash
generation events-and were skeptical of Kodak's ability to effectively
256th

reorganize.
Indeed, there was little doubt that Kodak was engaging in
dramatic downsizing as part of its process of reorganization. Kodak made
multiple motions to sell off assets in bankruptcy, 2 5 7 including its impressive
Digital Imaging Patent Portfolio. 25 8 This was a particularly noteworthy step;
Kodak's patents were seen by many as the most valuable and distinctive
assets owned by the company. They were eventually sold to long-time
competitor Fujifilm, as part of a syndicate of buyers.2 59

253

Debtors' Motion for an Order Authorizing Rejection of Certain Unexpired Aircraft

Leases Effective as of the Petition Date, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1: 12-bk-10202 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 27.
254 Motion to Reject Lease or Executory Contract-Motion for an Order Authorizing
Rejection of Certain Unexpired Nonresidential Real Property Leases, In re Eastman Kodak

Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 31.
255 Motion to Reject Lease or Executory Contract-First Omnibus Motion for an Order
Authorizing Rejection of Various Executory Contracts, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-

bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012), ECF No. 449.
256 See Objection/Omnibus Objection of Ad Hoc Committee of Second Lien Noteholders
to Debtors' First Day Relief and Statement Regarding the Debtors' DIP Financing Motion at

2, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No.
39.
257 See Motion to Authorize-Motion for Order (i)(A) Authorizing Certain Debtors Entry
into the Stalking Horse Purchase Agreement, (B) Authorizing and Approving the Bidding
Procedures and Break-Up Fee, (C) Approving the Notice Procedures, (D) Authorizing the
Filing of Certain Documents Under Seal and Setting a Date for the Sale Hearing and (II)
Authorizing and Approving the Sale of Certain Assets of Kodak Imaging Network Inc. Free
and Clear of All Claims and Interests, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2012), ECF No. 474; Motion to Approve Expedited Procedures for the Sale,
Transfer, Donation and/or Abandonment of De Minimis Assets, In re Eastman Kodak Co.,

No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012), ECF No. 173.
258 Motion to Authorize-Debtors' Motion for Orders (I)(A) Conditionally Authorizing
the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, (B) Establishing a
Competitive Bidding Process and (C) Approving the Notice Procedures and (II) Authorizing
the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests, In re Eastman Kodak Co.,

No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012), ECF No. 1361.
259 Order Authorizing the Sale of Patent Assets Free and Clear of Claims and Interests,
The License of Patents, The Assumption of Patent Cross License Agreements With Fujifilm
and the Settlement of Claims Related to Certain Patents, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-

bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013), ECF No. 2847. See also Sarah Mitroff, Kodak
Sells Digital Camera Patents to Apple, Google, Other Tech Giants, WIRED (Dec. 19, 2012),
https://www.wired.com/2012/12/kodak-patents/.
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Despite some creditor reservations and complexities of the case which
necessitated a motion to extend the time to submit a plan,2 60 Kodak's plan
was ultimately confirmed. As part of the plan, Kodak settled legacy pension
claims and made reduced payments to noteholders. Shareholder claims were
entirely wiped out. Although these shareholders voted against the plan, it
was approved over their objection by virtue of "cramdown" provisions that
permit a plan that has been accepted by other classes of creditors to proceed,
if fair and equitable. 26 1 Kodak was officially reorganized, and emerged from
bankruptcy discharged of debts as provided in the plan, albeit a very different
creature than it was entering bankruptcy.
4. Going Concern Value
Following its massive shed of assets, Kodak has struggled to define
itself. As part of its bankruptcy transformation, Kodak fully exited what it
described as the "low-growth dedicated capture device business," meaning
digital cameras, pocket video cameras, and digital picture frames, 262
essentially sacrificing the niche in which it had been known. No longer
would customers seek to capture a "Kodak moment," at least not on a Kodak
device. Instead, Kodak proposed to be a leader in inkjet-based digital
presses, digital printing plates, and other related products. It remains to be
seen what value Kodak can contribute in this field. Its brand, once so
familiar to consumers, is becoming less and less prominent to consumer
audiences. There is a sense that whatever Kodak determines to become, it
has little time to get there in the face of strong competitive forces,263 and the
danger of a second bankruptcy filing continues to loom.
D. Common Themes
Each of the companies described above were not always technological
dinosaurs. To the contrary, they were themselves built, at least initially, on
technological innovation. Borders and Blockbuster became industry giants
using advanced methods and models of inventory tracking, enabling them to
260 Motion to Extend Exclusivity Period for Filing a Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure
Statement and Solicit Acceptances Thereof, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012), ECF No. 831 [hereinafter Motion to Extend Exclusivity].
261 See Debtors' Memorandum of Law in Support of Confirmation of First Amended Joint
Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak Company and Its Debtor Affiliates, In

re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013), ECF No. 4863;
Notice of Filing of Revised Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Confirming the First Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of Eastman Kodak
Co. and its Debtor Affiliates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In re Eastman

Kodak Co., No. 1:12-bk-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013), ECF No. 4897.
262
263

Motion to Extend Exclusivity, supra note 260, at 42.
See Quentin Hardy, At Kodak, Clinging to a Future Beyond Film, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.

20, 2015, at BUl.
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provide goods more closely tailored to client demand. Kodak brought the
product of film and picture-taking to the consumer. These innovations
allowed each company to grow exponentially and capitalize on their
respective markets. However, each of these companies also failed, in large
part because they came to rely on their size or became complacent in the
provision of services that would quickly become obsolete in the face of
disruptive technologies.
In the case of Borders and Blockbuster, each company defined itself by
its ability to provide customers with multiple physical locations containing
shelves and shelves of product-books, movies, or other media. When the
ability to access these forms of media improved, first through online sales,
which soon were able to beat even the most well-stocked shelves in terms of
inventory, and then through wholesale digital streaming, which ceased to
require the purchase of any hard-copy materials, the companies were either
unable or unwilling to alter their business models in time. Technological
disruption proved to be the downfall of each, to the point that not even
bankruptcy proceedings, with their inherent advantages, were sufficient to
salvage them. 264
In the case of Kodak, the company had early access to technology that
would eventually reshape the world of photography and picture-taking.
However, the company realized that although the technology would improve
the ability of customers to take photos, it would also make photography
much less expensive, requiring significantly less of the product that Kodak
had traditionally marketed. Rather than accepting a short-term reduction in
profits, Kodak instead bartered away its future by refusing to change course
until the money in film had been entirely exhausted, and the alternatives
uncertain and rife with competition.
There are generally applicable lessons to be gleaned from these stories.
The most obvious is the clear need to act promptly when faced with a
technological disruption. In each scenario, the companies seemed to realize
the necessity of responding to technological changes embarrassingly late,
after new and disruptive innovators had already obtained a strong presence
in the market.26 5 In addition, even after recognizing the threat, each company
seemed to flounder with regard to establishing an effective strategic
response. Once it had acknowledged the threat posed by Amazon and
terminated its agreement with them, Borders initially attempted to respond

264

See Stephen Gandel, How Blockbuster Failed at Failing, TIME (Oct.
17, 2010),

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022624-2,00.html.
265

See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA 8 (1997) (comparing

coping with the onslaught of technological changes to climbing a mudslide raging down a
hill-"You have to scramble with everything you've got to stay on top of it, and if you ever
once stop to catch your breath, you get buried.").
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to the phenomenon of online book purchases by borrowing from a
sympathetic lender. It then limped along for three years, accruing debt and
bleeding cash reserves, before eventually filing for bankruptcy. Blockbuster
behaved erratically in response to its technological crisis, initially diving into
the online market under Antioco's leadership, but then largely shifting its
approach back to the old business model under Keyes. The company did not
file for bankruptcy until three years after the bankruptcy of its former
competitor, Hollywood Video. Kodak deliberately delayed the transition
into digital photography in a conscious effort to maximize the profit to be
made from traditional film. But even after it had concluded that a transition
was necessary, it attempted to do so outside of bankruptcy for nearly eight
years, only finally accepting bankruptcy relief when it could not sell its most
valuable assets.
It is impossible to say with certainty how circumstances might have
played out differently had these companies been faster to adjust to
technology, or even more prompt in taking advantage of bankruptcy
protection. Perhaps, if Borders had taken steps to jettison less-profitable
leases earlier and focused on the stores that maintained their profitability, it
would have retained its label and maintained an economic presence. If
Blockbuster had determined earlier to restructure its business through
bankruptcy proceedings, there might have been sufficient value in the
business to avoid a sale to Dish and instead exploit the Blockbuster brand
through its own online offerings. Finally, Kodak might have been more able
to salvage its value through an earlier going concern sale in bankruptcy, as
opposed to the piecemeal sale of individual assets over the course of several
years. This might have preserved the relevance of the term "Kodak moment"
in the realm of image preservation, rather than a hindsight reference to a poor
decision.
A second important lesson is that being large is not necessarily a
protection against failure, and may in fact be an obstacle in the effort to
adjust to new technologies. Although bankruptcy proceedings permit
companies to reject unprofitable leases and to sell assets in court auctions,
heavy investments in the wrong sorts of capital are not easily undone. Large
debt obligations, such as secured loans or pension plans, may be similarly
difficult to avoid, with significant consequences for the company and for
third parties. The larger the obligations and more complicated the industry,
the more difficult it may be to make those adjustments in a short period of
time.
In retrospect, it seems apparent that each of the three companies
described above were mismanaged in the years leading up to bankruptcy.
Management should have made adjustments to the business model earlier,
observing the changes on the horizon. It was management's lack of vision
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and refusal to pivot that caused the companies to fail. These examples
demonstrate that management cannot place their trust in consumer loyalty
when cheaper, more reliable options for service become available, even
when the company brand is far-reaching and powerful. Bankruptcy
protection cannot encourage the greater use of a debtor's products or services
when they become obsolete. In fact, bankruptcy may actually undermine the
marketing of products or services by virtue of the stigma associated with a
bankruptcy filing.
V. LAW FIRM BANKRUPTCIES

This Article argues that law firms are not immune to failure as a
consequence of technological disruption, and that the experiences of other
firms that have so failed demonstrate the need for law firms, and the industry
at large, to respond and adjust quickly to innovation affecting the legal field.
An obvious response to this cautionary tale, from the perspective of a law
firm, is that the practice of law is fundamentally different from the provision
of goods, and law firms are fundamentally different from corporations, with
different regulatory requirements and capital makeup. This is all true.
However, the unique character of a law firm makes the lessons of the
Blockbuster, Borders, and Kodak bankruptcies described above more
relevant, not less.
As demonstrated above, the advancement of technology is certainly
capable of rendering current models of providing legal services entirely
obsolete, as tasks traditionally performed by attorneys can be accomplished
faster and more efficiently by computer software programs. Law firms, like
any other business, may quickly find themselves unable to compete with
alternative providers who have adopted more robust technological methods,
such that their overhead costs are lower, their provision of services is faster
and more accurate, or they are otherwise a more desirable choice for clients.
However, law firms have even greater reason than other businesses to
respond and readjust to technological advances before bankruptcy becomes
a necessary reaction, because for law firms, bankruptcy proceedings almost
inevitably signal total demise, whether the reasons for filing are economic or
simply financial in nature.
Law firms find themselves in bankruptcy on a fairly frequent basis,
similar to firms in any other industry. However, unlike typical corporate
bankruptcy cases, these filings are much more likely to be involuntary-filed
by creditors of the firm rather than the partners themselveS 266-and
266 Although this paper has largely addressed the benefits of bankruptcy to the filing
debtor, they may be benefits to creditors as well, making an involuntary bankruptcy an
attractive alternative. For example, creditors may prefer the less rigorous process of filing a
claim for payment in bankruptcy to obtaining a legal judgment and attempting to enforce it,
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significantly more likely to end in liquidation of firm assets rather than
preservation of the company as a going concern.267 This may be explained
by two attributes shared by virtually all law firms. First, law firms are
generally formed as partnerships or, even more commonly, limited liability
partnerships (LLPs).26 8 Second, the principal, if not the only significant noncash assets of law firms are the personnel-the partners, associates, and
staff.2 69 Law firm partners are thus both the assets and the owners of the
company, and when partners begin to leave, their loss can trigger a partner
run that quickly bleeds the firm of value and renders it insolvent. 27 0 These
attributes also have the effect of making a law firm bankruptcy significantly
more painful for its partners, who lose their jobs in addition to their major
capital investments.
Unlike typical partnership agreements, which require dissolution of the
firm upon the exit of any partner,2 7 1 law firms, particularly large law firms,
permit the entrance and exit of partners without forcing dissolution of the
firm as a whole, permitting firms to survive beyond the lifetimes of the
founding individuals. However, this policy also permits partners to leave
and join other firms, frequently taking clients, projects, and associates with
them. Ethical rules typically prohibit the imposition of non-compete clauses
or other restrictions on an attorney's ability to take firm clients.272
Accordingly, law firms have little ability, other than the powers of
persuasion, to convince remaining partners to stay with the firm through a
period of financial distress.
When a critical number of partners leave a law firm, or when the
remaining partners lose their faith in the firms' ability to thrive in the long
term, there arises a strong incentive for remaining partners to also leave,
rather than attempt to reorganize or otherwise rehabilitate a firm struggling

recognizing that under state law creditors will be competing amongst themselves in a race to
the debtor's assets. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), 502(a) (defining claims broadly and allowing
all claims unless a party in interest objects). In addition, and of particular relevance in the
context of a law firm debtor, bankruptcy proceedings may permit the recovery of preferential
payments made while the debtor was insolvent. See supra note 90.
267 Although law firms may file under chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, it is generally
to confirm a liquidation plan. See Morley, supra note 11, at 1-2.
268 Lawyers are generally prohibited by rules of professional conduct from allowing nonlawyers to share in legal fees. This has generally restricted a law firm's ability to organize as
a corporation, rather than a partnership. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.4:
Professional Independence of a Lawyer.
269 See Jacqueline Palank, Debts ofDefunct Law FirmsHaunt Partnersin Next Job, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 7, 2011 (quoting bankruptcy expert Paul A. Rubin as saying "[t]he most valuable
assets of a law firm go home every night").
270 See Morley, supra note 11, at 2.
271 Id. at 18.
272
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to maintain its cash flow. 2 73 Particularly when the firm's profits have fallen
below what may be offered by competitors, partners are incentivized to
move, not just for future income but also to protect their capital
investment.2 74 The moment a firm becomes insolvent, that investment
becomes worthless, and in bankruptcy, may actually be a liability, opening
them up to recovery actions by the bankruptcy estate.2 75 Once partners begin
to leave, there is nothing to prevent others from following. Although
bankruptcy operates as a stay against the withdrawal of typical "assets" from
the bankruptcy estate, it cannot force attorneys to stay in the employ of the
law firm, and in the event of a bankruptcy filing, attorneys almost never
do. 2 76
In fact, there is a strong motivation to leave in advance of the firm
dissolution to avoid being caught in the relevant "clawback" period. Partners
whose law firm dissolves frequently find themselves liable for a firm's
unpaid debts in bankruptcy court, pursuant to clawback lawsuits, 27 7 by virtue
Red flags of an eventual bankruptcy include the voluntary departure of attorneys. As
observed by Al Togut, "[a] trickle can become a flood fairly quickly. With each departing
partner, income diminishes and that exacerbates the problem. A law firm's principal asset is
its people who go home each night. If they go home one night and don't return in the morning,
the firm is out of business." David J. Parnell, Al Togut of Togut, Segal, On Avoiding Law
Firm Bankruptcies, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidparnell/2014/
08/04/al-togut-of-togut-segal-on-avoiding-law-firm-bankruptcies/3/#7b7a57f82f91.
274
Most law firms tend to require a capital investment from partners, which can be
substantial. Rule 5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires law firms to return
capital to partners when they leave.
275 See Matthew C. Heyn, The Application of Jewel v. Boxer to Law Firm Dissolutions,
L.A. LAw., Nov. 2014, at 14, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/
2014-issues/november2014.pdf ("The dissolution of a law firm can be a financial catastrophe
for its partners.").
276
There is a notable counterexample to this trend, however, in the chapter 11 filing of
Ruden McClosky, P.A., in 2011. Ruden filed for chapter 11 after the financial crisis in 2008
precipitated three-and-a-half years of net losses. Ruden blamed these losses on both a
substantial reduction in work and "the departure of many Ruden attorneys, voluntary and
involuntary, which further reduced Ruden's income." Disclosure Statement in Connection
with Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidation of Ruden McClosky P.A. at 8, In re Ruden
McClosky P.A., No. I l-bk-40603 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2012), ECF No. 355. Ruden
attempted to accomplish a merger or a sale outside of bankruptcy, but was unsuccessful. As
revenue continued to decline, Ruden reached an agreement with Greenspoon Marder, P.A.,
pursuant to which Ruden would accomplish a sale of all its assets to Greenspoon through
bankruptcy proceedings. Included in the agreement was a provision that permitted remaining
Ruden employees to join Greenspoon. Id. Although Ruden, like other bankrupt law firms,
was ultimately liquidated and ceased to exist as a going concern, bankruptcy was effective in
keeping the assets and the personnel of the Ruden firm in the same organization, even if it no
longer retained the firm name. By most standards, this would be categorized as a successful
chapter 11 case.
277
In such litigation, a bankruptcy trustee will demand that former partners return all or
a substantial portion of their draws made in the period leading up to the firm's dissolution.
These claims may be made pursuant to applicable state law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1978)
(permitting a trustee to void any transfer of the debtor avoidable under state law or pursuant
273
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of fraudulent conveyance or preference litigation, or on the basis of the
unfinished business doctrine, as most famously set forth in the case Jewel v.
Boxer.2 78 Under the doctrine of unfinished business, partners who take
clients and client matters from the old firm to a new firm may have a duty to
account to the old firm, or in the case of insolvency, the old firm's creditors,
for a portion of the fees received.279
There have been several notable law firm bankruptcies within the past
decade, almost all of which ended in liquidation and included a fair amount
of clawback from former partners. For example, in the bankruptcy of
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, a firm of over 900 attorneys that
dissolved and filed an involuntary bankruptcy in 2003, partners eventually
80
agreed to the trustee's demand to return over $22 million.2 Heller Ehrnan
LLP had more than 500 attorneys just before filing its chapter 11 petition in
281
Heller's former
response to being declared in default by its major lender.
partners (termed shareholders by the firm) were required to repay an average
of $100,000 each.282 Perhaps the largest law firm collapse in living memory
was that of Dewey & Leboeuf LLP in 2012.283 Prior to dissolution, Dewey
284
in
boasted roughly 1,400 attorneys spread throughout twenty-six offices.
order to obtain a release of claims against them, partners repaid $71.5
million, with several partners individually paying more than $1 million back
to the bankruptcy estate.285

to bankruptcy-specific provisions permitting the recovery of funds distributed while the
debtor was insolvent.). See, also e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-48.

278 Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal. App. 3d 171 (1984).

279 See Michael D. DeBaecke & Victoria A. Guilfoyle, Law Firm Dissolutions: When the
Music Stops, Does Anyone Need to Account for Any UnfinishedBusiness?, 14 DEL. L. REv.
41, 44 (2013) (noting a difference between states as to whether the unfinished business
doctrine applies to hourly fee matters in addition to contingency fee matters); Christine Hurt,
The Limited Liability Partnershipin Bankruptcy, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 577-86 (2015)
(detailing application of the Jewel doctrine in recent high-profile law firm bankruptcies).
280 See Ribstein, supra note 34, at 771-72.
281 See Tom Abate & Andrew S. Ross, Heller Ehrman law firm to dissolve friday, S.F.
GATE (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Heller-Ehrman-law-firm-to-

dissolve-Friday-3193215.php.
282
283

Heyn, supranote 275, at 14.
See Edward S. Adams, Rethinking the Law Firm Organizational Form and
Capitalization Structure, 78 Mo. L. REv. 777, 777 (2013). Those with longer memories
would also remember Finley Kumble as an industry giant that failed spectacularly. With
nearly 700 lawyers at the time of its bankruptcy in 1987, it was by far the largest law firm
failure of its time. See E.R. Shipp, Finley, Kumble, Major Law Firm, Facing Revamping or
Dissolution, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/11/business/
finley-kumble-major-law-firm-facing-revamping-or-dissolution.html.
284 Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Filesfor Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy/.
285 See Heyn, supranote 275.
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Although each law firm described above failed in slightly different
ways, they shared a common pattern. As one author has recognized, law
firms that failed demonstrated the pattern of "growth for the sake of growth,"
celebrating "bigness" as a virtue, a characteristic which, as described above,
is unlikely to be beneficial in the face of technological advance and may in
fact be a liability.286 As demonstrated by these firms, and by the cases of
Blockbuster, Borders, and Kodak above, a large, significant investment in
outdated technology can prove far more costly than beneficial in the face of
technological innovation. BigLaw firms should recognize the limited value
and the very real danger in simply being big.
In addition, in light of the continual technological advances
characteristic of our times, BigLaw firms should recognize the danger in
complacency.
There is evidence that many law firms have seen the
advantages of artificial intelligence and are investing in its technology,
although its experimental and potentially threatening nature may provoke
resistance amongst those firms that have profited under the old model. 287
This is Kodak's story, and firms seeking a future would be well-advised not
to grow too comfortable in an ever-changing present.
BigLaw firms should also avoid large investment in out-of-date
technology or its supporting capital structure, analogous to Borders'
unprofitable leases.
This could include, unfortunately, investing in
associates in reliance on the model of churn-individuals who the firm has
no intention of making a partner and in whom the firm is unwilling to invest
time and training. As coveted as BigLaw jobs are now, they may become
even more competitive, particularly if changes in the type of work and the
level of firm investment induce more associates to stay at their jobs. Law

286

See, e.g., HARPER, supra note 39, at 149 ("Dewey & LeBoeuf had some unique
problems, including multiyear compensation packages to legacy partners of the merged firms
and massive debt that included millions in outside investor bonds and outstanding IOUs to
partners when the firm failed to meet annual profit targets. But it was also a vivid example of
ubiquitous trends in big law firms: growth for the sake of growth; combining firms without
respect for their differing cultures; concentrating wealth and power at the top within so-called
partnerships; eroding a middle class of equity partners who might bring more accountability
to their firm leaders; using client silos as definitive measures of value; offering expensive
guaranteed contracts as part of an aggressive lateral hiring approach that undermines
collegiality and community."); see also Hurt, supra note 279, at 567 (observing that large,
brand-name law firms that had filed in recent years "expanded through hiring and mergers,
took on expensive lease commitments, borrowed large sums of money, and then could not
meet financial obligations once markets took a downturn and practice groups scattered to

other firms").
287

See Jane Croft, Artificial intelligence disruptingthe business oflaw, FIN. TIMES (Oct.

5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5d96dd72-83eb-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5;

George S.

Bellas, Is the Future of the Practice of Law in Jeopardy?, Arr'Ys CREATIVE ROUNDTABLE,
http://www.attorneyscreativeroundtable.com/is-the-future-of-the-practice-of-law-in-

jeopardy/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
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schools may do their part to better prepare students for jobs, not just in
BigLaw but elsewhere, by training students in human interaction as well as
the cultivation of artificial intelligence.288
By far, the most important lesson to be derived from these historical
examples is not to delay in responding to technological disruption. Value is
best preserved early, and bankruptcy reorganization proceedings can be most
effective when there is still sufficient value in the company to justify them.
For many, the uncertain and unknowable nature of technological advances
can encourage a state of paralysis. 28 9 Giving into this paralysis will both
increase the likelihood of requiring bankruptcy proceedings and decrease the
likelihood that such proceedings will result in a successful reorganization.
VI. CONCLUSION

Firms fail for a variety of reasons, but as technological advances permit
the shift of work from professionals to increasingly capable machines, 290 it
is rational to expect a broader range of businesses, including law firms, to
make adjustments to the new market reality or become uncompetitive. As
this Article has demonstrated, companies that were once at the top of their
industries have been felled by their inability or reluctance to adjust to
technological disruption. The tools provided by the Bankruptcy Code are
intended to permit firms to reassess and redirect assets in order to maximize
value. When adopted too late, even these tools are insufficient to save
companies that have squandered their opportunities for early readjustment.
For law firms, bankruptcy tools may be particularly ineffective in light of the
particular constraints associated with law firm capital-attorneys and other
personnel. Accordingly, as technology changes, law firms should be
prepared to make adjustments early on in order to avoid the failure associated
with unanswered technological disruption.

Some law schools have already moved in this direction. See Christy Burke, Winning
the battle to teach legal technology and innovation at law schools, LEGAL IT TODAY (Mar.
17, 2017), http://burke-company.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/LegallTToday-Winningthe-battle-to-teach-legal-technology-and-innovation-at-law-schools.pdf.
289 See Margolis & Murray, supra note 6, at 2 ("Lawyers from [prior] generations
remember a time before technology was so ubiquitous[.] .. . They are certainly aware of
technology, and use it, but are often suspicious of newer technologies and what they have to
offer.").
290 See RicHARD SusSKIND & DANIEL SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONS: How
TECHNOLOGY WILL TRANSFORM THE WORK OF HuMAN EXPERTS (2015).
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